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DEFENDING WHITE SPACE
Addie C. Rolnick †

“What I knew then, what black people have been required to know, is that
there are few things more dangerous than the perception that one is a danger.”
—Jelani Cobb, Between the World and Ferguson 1
Police violence against minorities has generated a great deal of scholarly and
public attention. Proposed solutions—ranging from body cameras to greater federal
oversight to anti-bias training for police—likewise focus on violence as a problem of
policing. Amid this national conversation, however, insufficient attention has been
paid to private violence. This Article examines the relationship between race, selfdefense laws, and modern residential segregation. The goal is to sketch the contours
of an important but undertheorized relationship between residential segregation,
private violence, and state criminal law. By describing the interplay between
residential segregation and modern self-defense law, this Article reveals how criminal
law reinforces racial subordination in areas where it is nominally prohibited by law.
While the laws governing stranger self-defense are facially race-neutral, selfdefense is assessed only according to whether the defendant’s fear is reasonable to the
reviewing prosecutor, judge, or jury. Research on unconscious bias and cultural
myths about criminality demonstrate that fear is racially contingent. One factor that
† Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law. I am indebted to Neelum Arya, Mario Barnes,
Devon Carbado, Andrea Freeman, Sara Gordon, Cheryl Harris, Sylvia Lazos, Priscilla Ocen,
Kim Pearson, and Michalyn Steele for comments and suggestions; the faculties of UNLV’s
William S. Boyd School of Law, BYU’s J. Reuben Clark Law School, the University of New
Mexico School of Law, and Yeshiva University’s Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law;
participants in the Southwest Criminal Law Workshop; and students in Devon Carbado’s
Advanced Critical Race Theory Seminar at UCLA for helpful critiques. I also thank Matthew
Wright, Elliot Anderson, and Alexis Wendl for excellent research assistance.
1 Jelani Cobb, Between the World and Ferguson, NEW YORKER (Aug. 26, 2014), http://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/world-ferguson [https://perma.cc/Q4AG-6RSN].
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can support both subjective and objective assessments of threat is whether a person
looks “out of place,” making a Black person in a White neighborhood even more
likely to the be the object of fear. This relationship between race, fear, place, and legal
violence sets a framework that shapes a continuum of neighborhood interactions,
from surveillance to calling 9-1-1 to engaging in lethal violence.
History elucidates this relationship. Self-defense evolved to protect the right of
White men to defend their bodies, homes, families, and honor. Against this tilted
backdrop, state legislatures strengthened and expanded the private right of selfdefense by adding presumptions that relax its basic substantive requirements and
alter the common law procedural approach to insulate more cases from judicial
scrutiny. In the neighborhood context, modern self-defense laws signal to private
actors that they are free, if they legitimately feel threatened, to use violence to police
their own realms. But they do not send a uniform signal to all actors. For Black
people in White neighborhoods, self-defense laws are a reminder that the law
condones, and even encourages, fear-based violence against them. For White people
living in White spaces, a robust right of self-defense suggests that it is desirable—a
right and a duty—to protect one’s home and neighborhood from intruders. By
underscoring White ownership, and increasing Black vulnerability, self-defense laws
further inscribe already-segregated neighborhoods as White spaces in an era when
property laws no longer do so explicitly.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2012, a resident of a majority-White neighborhood
of gated and planned subdivisions shot and killed an unarmed Black
teenager. The killer suspected the teenager was trying to break into his
house and shot him through the back door. The killer claimed selfdefense. His claim was never evaluated by a jury, though, because police
and prosecutors saw the claim of self-defense as strong enough to not
warrant a charge.
The teenager’s name was DeMarcus Carter. He lived in Las Vegas,
Nevada, and he died in a suburban neighborhood called Summerlin. 2
2 Jackie Valley, Las Vegas Teen Identified as Intruder Killed in Summerlin, LAS VEGAS SUN
(Mar. 21, 2012, 2:45 PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2012/mar/21/police-identify-intrudershot-summerlin [https://perma.cc/7RYM-88RJ]. Located on the western edge of Las Vegas,
Summerlin is a collection of planned villages that began development in 1990. HOWARD
HUGHES CORP., SUMMERLIN (2017), http://summerlin.com/uploads/files/Summerlin-Overview101-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MAX-UABN]. Summerlin South, where Carter was killed, is
sixty-eight percent White. It has seventeen percent more White residents and five percent more
Asian residents than Las Vegas; it has four percent fewer Black residents and seventeen percent
fewer Hispanic residents than Las Vegas. See Race and Ethnicity in Summerlin South, Nevada,
STATISTICAL ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.com/place/Nevada/Summerlin-South/Race-andEthnicity#figure/place-in-united-states [https://perma.cc/99NB-HPXN] (last updated Sept. 10,
2018). Summerlin North is sixty-three percent White. It has seventeen percent more White
residents and six percent more Asian residents than Las Vegas; it has four percent fewer Black
residents and nineteen percent fewer Hispanic residents than Las Vegas. Among Las Vegas
neighborhoods, it has one of the smallest non-White populations. See Race and Ethnicity in
Summerlin North, Las Vegas, Nevada, STATISTICAL ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.com/
neighborhood/Nevada/Las-Vegas/Summerlin-North/Race-and-Ethnicity
[https://perma.cc/8T64-DZ4Q] (last updated Sept. 14, 2018). Data on the site is taken from the
2010 Census and the 2012–2016 American Community Survey. See About, STATISTICAL ATLAS,
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His killer told police that he saw Carter outside his back door and
believed Carter was trying to break into his home. Unlike the death of
Trayvon Martin in Florida only a month earlier, 3 Carter’s death received
very little media coverage, and none of the coverage raised questions
about the validity of the killer’s self-defense claim. 4 The local newspaper
and police department, which in 2012 collected and publicized detailed
information about the circumstances and legal outcome of every police
killing, 5 did not similarly track private self-defense killings.
https://statisticalatlas.com/about#data [https://perma.cc/FR2S-TFPR] (last updated Aug. 28,
2018).
3 See Dan Barry, Serge Kovaleski, Campbell Robertson & Lizette Alvarez, Race, Tragedy
and Outrage Collide After a Shot in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-prompts-a-review-of-ideals.html
[https://perma.cc/8RNS-CXR7]. Martin was killed on February 26th by George Zimmerman, a
neighborhood watch captain in a majority White and Hispanic gated community called The
Retreat at Twin Lakes. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness:
The Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1113, 1171–72 (2016) (describing the neighborhood’s history and demographics). He happened
upon Martin, a Black teenager, while driving through the neighborhood and thought Martin
looked and acted suspicious. A confrontation ensued that ended in Martin’s death. Id. at 1114.
Florida had recently enacted a package of expansions to its self-defense laws. See Zachary L.
Weaver, Note, Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for
Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2008); Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look
at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 832–33 (2013); Jessica Travis & Jeffrey
James, Know the Ground You’re Standing On: Analyzing Stand Your Ground and Self-Defense
in Florida’s Legal System, 20 BARRY L. REV. 91 (2014). Martin’s death and Zimmerman’s
subsequent acquittal consequently became focal points for criticism of expanded self-defense
laws. The case became a catalyst for protests against the everyday threat of violence at the hands
of police and civilians experienced by African Americans. The Black Lives Matter movement in
many ways grew out of the Zimmerman acquittal, although it crystallized in response to the
deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner at the hands of police officers who similarly claimed
self-defense.
4 See, e.g., Mike Blasky, Man Slain in Summerlin Yard Had Lengthy Record, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J. (Mar. 22, 2012, 12:13 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/courts/man-slain-insummerlin-yard-had-lengthy-record [https://perma.cc/7NA5-JWG7] (describing arrest history
of Demarcus Carter).
5 Following a controversial 2011 police killing, the Las Vegas Review-Journal published an
in-depth investigation of police use of force and began maintaining an interactive database with
details for each incident of police use of force. See Deadly Force: When Las Vegas Police Shoot,
and Kill, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Nov. 5, 2011, 6:19 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/
courts/deadly-force-when-las-vegas-police-shoot-and-kill [https://perma.cc/KQH4-4X9Y]. The
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department updated its use of force policies in 2012, see Ricardo
Torres-Cortez, Metro Demonstrates Progress and Revamped Use-of-force Policies, LAS VEGAS
SUN (May 1, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/may/01/metro-demonstrates-
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Nevada is not a Southern state known for a deep history of statesponsored segregation. Las Vegas, like other Sun Belt cities, is often
touted as a model of integration, 6 and the exponential population
growth that made it a major urban center came well after the end of
legal segregation. 7 Summerlin itself was undeveloped desert until the
1990s. 8 Unlike Florida, which adopted a high-profile package of
amendments to expand its law of self-defense shortly before Martin was
killed, 9 Nevada had recently rejected some of the most far-reaching
proposals for amendments to expand its self-defense law. 10 Nevada has
long had a stand your ground rule, which eliminates the duty to retreat

progress-and-revamped-use-of-fo [https://perma.cc/FKA4-KTWC], and now shares detailed
information with the public regarding all police killings. Jaweed Kaleem & David Montero, A
Police Officer Kills an Unarmed Black Man, and, in Las Vegas, There Are No Protests, L.A.
TIMES (May 19, 2017, 3:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-vegas-police-chokehold20170519-story.html [https://perma.cc/L3ZB-T564].
6 See, e.g., Haya El Nasser, Living Las Vegas: Sun Belt Cities Offer New Take on Race, AL
JAZEERA AM. (Mar. 19, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/19/sunbelt-cities-offernewtakeonrace.html [https://perma.cc/8FR4-3C69] (citing research showing
that Las Vegas has one of the lowest levels of residential segregation and opining that “[t]he
most striking reason for the lower rate of segregation is that most of these newer places have
few remnants of a pre-civil-rights society and fewer established racial enclaves.”).
7 EUGENE P. MOEHRING, RESORT CITY IN THE SUNBELT: LAS VEGAS, 1930–2000 39, 106,
261 (2d ed. 2000) (describing a post-war influx in the 1940s, a population that “ballooned from
40,000 to 240,000” during the 1950s and 1960s and then “exploded from 270,000 . . . to 1.3
million” after 1970). From the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, Las Vegas was America’s
fastest-growing metropolitan area. Id. at 261.
8 Amanda Finnegan, Summerlin: Past and Present, LAS VEGAS SUN (Aug. 18, 2008, 3:54
PM),
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2008/aug/18/summerlin-past-and-present
[http://
perma.cc/4TMA-BNNT].
9 Such laws are often referred to as “stand your ground” laws, but the term can be
misleading. As described infra in Section I.C, a stand your ground law eliminates the common
law requirement of necessity by permitting a person to respond with deadly force even if safe
retreat was available. In other words, these laws allow a person to “stand his ground” instead of
backing down from a confrontation. Florida law, and the law of many other states, has other
provisions that make self-defense easier to claim and make it available in more circumstances.
10 In 2011, the Nevada legislature rejected a proposed amendment to expand habitation law
to include vehicles and workplaces and add a presumption of reasonable fear in certain cases.
See, e.g., A.B. 381, 76th Leg. (Nev. 2011) (proposing to expand defense of habitation rule to
include workplaces and vehicles). It passed substantially the same provisions in 2015, see S.B.
175, 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015), but rejected a version of the proposed law that would have extended
the right to unoccupied vehicles. See id., amended by S. Amendment 136 (2015), https://www.
leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/78th2015/Bill/1548/Text# [https://perma.cc/4WKY-P9TF].
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before using deadly force, 11 but Carter’s killing was legal under an even
older rule: Nevada’s defense of habitation law, which authorizes the
resident of a home to use deadly force to defend against a person
anywhere outside the home if that person appears to be planning to
break into the home. 12 If Martin’s death represented the failure of the
justice system—despite a national outcry—to punish the killer of an
innocent “teenage boy with his packet of candy and sweet tea,” 13
Carter’s death was an example of the unexceptional cases in which the
legal system and the public accepted a neighborhood killing as inevitable
and legal.
In the years since Martin and Carter were killed, scores of unarmed
Black and brown 14 people have died at the hands of people claiming self11 The state’s stand your ground rule was first set forth in an 1872 case. See State v.
Kennedy, 7 Nev. 374, 376–77 (1872); see also Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1990)
(confirming, more recently, the judicial rule that a non-aggressor has no duty to retreat). It was
first codified in 2011 as NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120(2) (West 2019). See A.B. 321, 76th Leg.
(Nev. 2011); see also Lawrence Mower, Nevada’s Stand Your Ground Law Goes Back 140 Years,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Apr. 4, 2012, 1:02 AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/courts/
nevadas-stand-your-ground-law-goes-back-140-years [https://perma.cc/TY37-Z2FT] .
12 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120(1) (defining justifiable homicide to include killing “in defense
of habitation . . . against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to
commit a felony, or against any person or persons who manifestly intend and endeavor, in a
violent, riotous, tumultuous or surreptitious manner, to enter the habitation of another for the
purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein”).
13 Patricia J. Williams, The Monsterization of Trayvon Martin, NATION (July 31, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/monsterization-trayvon-martin
[http://perma.cc/KW9CVK2R].
14 Blackness, or more specifically fear of Blackness, is central to this analysis. In this
country, the historical association of Blacks with criminality is tied to efforts to maintain Black
subordination in the post-Reconstruction era. As described infra in Section II.C, psychological
studies demonstrate that this association persists today. It is not, however, an exhaustive
account of non-White vulnerability to fear-based violence. For example, recent accounts show
that Native Americans, see The Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission Responds to the
Shooting of Kriston Charles Belinte Chee, NATIVE NEWS ONLINE (Mar. 05, 2014), http://
nativenewsonline.net/currents/navajo-nation-human-rights-commission-responds-shootingkriston-charles-belinte-chee [http://perma.cc/ZSY9-KQZU], Latinx people, see Carlos Saucedo,
High-Speed Chase Ends With Officers Killing Woman, ABC10 (May 19, 2017, 3:50 PM), https://
www.abc10.com/article/news/local/citrus-heights/high-speed-chase-ends-with-officers-killingwoman/277655580 [http://perma.cc/Y74L-VBK6], and South Asians, see Alabama Police
Officer Testifies Against Colleague Who Beat Indian Man, GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015, 3:57 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/02/alabama-police-officer-testifies-indian-man
[http://perma.cc/RET8-LWJG], may also be perceived as threatening, and Native people
experience the highest per capita rates of police violence. Mike Males, Who Are Police Killing?
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defense. Many of the names are familiar: Michael Brown, Eric Garner,
Jordan Davis, Tamir Rice, Sean Bell, Walter Scott, Terence Crutcher,
Philando Castile, Jordan Edwards, Charleena Lyles, Loreal Tsingine,
Alton Sterling, Keith Lamont Scott, Botham Jean, Stephon Clark,
Lacquan McDonald. Others may not be: Kriston Charles Belinte Chee,
John Williams, Renisha McBride, Rumain Brisbon, Cesar Arce, Jessica
Hernandez, Charley Leundeu “Africa” Keunang, D’Andre Berghardt, Jr.,
Gabriella Nevarez, John Crawford III, Jonathan Mitchell.
Many died at the hands of police officers who claimed that their
actions were reasonable—and therefore legal—responses to real or
perceived threats posed by the victims. In most of the resolved cases, the
officer was either not charged or was acquitted in the homicide. 15 In
CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST. (2014), http://www.cjcj.org/news/8113 [http://perma.cc/VWS7J9BX]; see also Stephanie Woodard, The Police Killings No One is Talking About, IN THESE
TIMES
(Oct.
17,
2016),
http://inthesetimes.com/features/native_american_police_
killings_native_lives_matter.html [https://perma.cc/98Q6-TRUX]. While other non-White
groups may be perceived as threatening and out of place, I save analysis of the precise dynamics
affecting different minority groups for future articles.
15 See, e.g., Eyder Peralta & Bill Chappell, Ferguson Jury: No Charges for Officer in Michael
Brown’s Death, NPR (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/24/
366370100/grand-jury-reaches-decision-in-michael-brown-case
[https://perma.cc/8L56KRLX]; The Eric Garner Case’s Sickening Outcome, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/eugene-robinson-the-eric-garner-cases-sickeningoutcome/2014/12/03/283c0e02-7b5c-11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html?noredirect=on&
utm_term=.16b5ba53481e [https://perma.cc/4Q7T-7PNV] (grand jury declined to indict);
Richard Luscombe, Michael Dunn Sentenced to Life Without Parole for Killing of Florida
Teenager, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/
oct/17/michael-dunn-sentenced-life-without-parole-florida
[https://perma.cc/596T-HLNL]
(killer of Jordan Davis sentenced to life without parole); Ashely Fantz, Steve Almasy &
Catherine E. Shoichet, Tamir Rice Shooting: No Charges for Officers, CNN (Dec. 28, 2015, 7:22
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/28/us/tamir-rice-shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/
CX66-3EPC]; Officers Acquitted in Sean Bell Case, NPR (Apr. 25, 2008, 12:00 PM), https://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89938081
[https://perma.cc/TY87-MXX7];
Alan Blinder, Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott Shooting, Gets 20-Year Sentence, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/michael-slager-sentence-walterscott.html [https://perma.cc/9MBW-HP6E]; Bill Chappell, Tulsa Police Officer Is Found Not
Guilty in Death of Terence Crutcher, NPR (May 18, 2017), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/18/528915380/tulsa-police-officer-is-found-not-guilty-in-deathof-terence-crutcher [https://perma.cc/4QTZ-DFZQ]; Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted
in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/
16/us/police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html
[https://perma.cc/PQP2-9N4W];
Faith
Karimi & Emanuella Grinberg, Texas Ex-Officer is Sentenced to 15 Years for Killing an
Unarmed Teen, CNN (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/29/us/texas-jordan-
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response to these cases, the topic of police violence against minorities
has generated a great deal of scholarly and public attention. 16 Proposed
solutions—ranging from body cameras to greater federal oversight to
anti-bias training for police—likewise focus on violence as a problem of
policing.
Amid this national conversation about policing and criminal
justice, however, insufficient attention has been paid to private violence.
Martin, Carter, Chee, Arce, Mitchell, Davis, McBride, and many other
unnamed victims were killed by private citizens. Like the police officers
involved in other cases, many of their killers were not charged or were
eventually acquitted. 17 The legal claim involved in these cases is similar
in many respects to the claims of police officers: in each case the killer
edwards-death-sentencing-phase/index.html
[https://perma.cc/EQ7E-QARL]
(discussing
Jordan Edwards); Lynsi Burton, SPD: Charleena Lyles Shooting Consistent with Policy, Training,
SEATTLE PI (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.seattlepi.com/local/seattlenews/article/SPDCharleena-Lyles-shooting-consistent-with-12422144.php. Several of the killings in which
officers who were acquitted or not charged criminally nevertheless resulted in civil judgments
against the officers, suggesting that there was some evidence that the police acted illegally.
16 See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from Social Psychology, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 2961 (2015); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial
Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115 (2014); Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police
Terror of Violent Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57 (2014); Devon Carbado, From
Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 125 (2017).
17 See supra note 15. Only McBride’s and Davis’ killers were punished. Theodore Wafer
shot McBride when she knocked on his door seeking help one night. Wafer thought McBride
was an intruder and feared for his life. Wafer was convicted of second-degree murder. See Mary
M. Chapman, Theodore Wafer Sentenced to 17 Years in Michigan Shooting of Renisha McBride,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/us/theodore-wafersentenced-in-killing-of-renisha-mcbride.html [https://perma.cc/VEC2-J6YE]. The state
supreme court rejected Wafer’s request for a new trial. See Oralandar Brand-Williams, State
Supreme Court Denies New Trial in Porch Shooting, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 9, 2018, 2:46 PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2018/03/09/theodore-waferdenied-new-trial-porch-shooting/32778751 [https://perma.cc/HAN6-846B]. Michael Dunn,
who shot into Davis’s car after an argument about the volume of the music in Davis’s car, was
convicted of first degree murder during a retrial and his appeal was denied. See Tarik Minor,
Michael Dunn Attorney Files Appeal Brief in Tallahassee, NEWS 4 JAX (Mar. 17, 2016), https://
www.news4jax.com/news/local/jacksonville/michael-dunn-attorneys-file-appeal-in-tallahassee
[https://perma.cc/KJ85-T4TX]. George Zimmerman was tried and acquitted for killing Martin.
See Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdicttrayvon-martin.html [https://perma.cc/C47T-6JUU]. The killers of Carter, Chee, Arce, and
Mitchell were never charged.
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claimed he 18 feared the victim, and that this fear was reasonable under
the circumstances. None of the reforms proposed to address police
violence would have any effect on the private neighbor-on-neighbor
violence that led to their deaths.
Instead, these killings force us to examine the traditional doctrine
of self-defense, the extent to which racial fear is embedded in the law,
and the significance of the trend among state legislatures to expand the
right of self-defense even as more evidence emerges of its
disproportionate impact on minorities. These cases shift the focus from
police accountability to the role of private parties in enforcing racial
exclusion and hierarchy. They also complicate the picture of the
relationship between private violence and state law.
While policing and incarceration are the most visible institutions
through which the government regulates and authorizes violence, which
critics argue is often deployed in service of maintaining racial
subordination, this Article reveals that substantive criminal law is
another such institution. State criminal laws determine to a large extent
what violence will be punished and what will be permitted. By
expanding the categories of permissible violence, state legislatures can
authorize private parties to carry out violence while appearing to reign
in state-sponsored violence. This public-private distinction is significant
when considering racial violence because state-sponsored race
discrimination of any kind is prohibited by federal law, 19 while private
race discrimination, particularly violence, is illegal under federal law
only in its most extreme and blatant forms.
This Article considers the role of self-defense doctrine in
maintaining White residential spaces. Common law self-defense
doctrine evolved in large part to secure the right of White men to
protect their homes, families, and honor. 20 The “reasonable fear”
All were killed by men, although the need for protection of White women figures
prominently in the story of neighborhood self-defense. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From
Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin: The Persistence of White Womanhood and the Preservation of
White Manhood, DU BOIS REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 21–33) (on file with author).
19 But see Carbado, supra note 16 (describing instances in which the Fourth Amendment
permits police to engage in race discrimination).
20 See Jeanne Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 237, 243–48 (2008) (“The true man’s role, to protect the home and family, functioned
as a model for the broader self-defense right of the true man.”); CAROLINE LIGHT, STAND YOUR
18
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component of modern self-defense laws continues to reify our welldocumented unconscious racial bias and reinforce cultural myths about
Black criminality, even when we intend for the law to be race-neutral. 21
Building on feminist and critical race theory critiques of self-defense
law, this Article argues that the core doctrine of self-defense has been
strengthened and expanded to further insulate private violence in
defense of home and family from legal scrutiny. 22
Modern state self-defense laws extend to a broad range of
circumstances and physical spaces, especially in residential
neighborhoods. 23 These laws signal to private actors that they are free, if
GROUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE 28, 57–62
(2017); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 125–74 (2007); see also Mary Ann Franks, Real Men Advance, Real
Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male
Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1108–14 (2014) (arguing that the castle doctrine and stand
your ground laws invoke the idea of women as victims in need of male protection but do not
fully protect women’s right to defend themselves).
Some scholars have suggested that the constitutional right to bear arms also has roots in
the desire to protect White property interests against Black and Indian uprisings and people.
See Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1694–96 (2012); SAUL CORNELL, A
WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN
AMERICA, 39–40 (2006).
21 Cynthia Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 91, 103 (2014); Cynthia
Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91
N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1584–85 (2013); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and
the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 318 (2012).
22 By contrast, victims of domestic violence who kill their abusers face a very real doctrinal
hurdle in trying to claim self-defense because, while the doctrine easily protects a man
defending his home against a stranger in a direct confrontation, it does not always clearly
protect a woman when she kills someone with whom she shares a home and knows well,
especially if she does so during a quiet moment instead of during a fight. See generally Holly
Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform
Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 409–20 (1991) (describing how courts’ interpretation of the
imminence, proportionality, and retreat rules can exclude or disadvantage a claim of selfdefense by a battered woman); CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED
WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE AND THE LAW (1990). This is an area where amendments to the law
might be needed to adequately protect women, yet even efforts to reinterpret existing doctrine
have encountered resistance. See Victoria Nourse, The “Normal” Successes and Failures of
Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 951, 970–76 (2000). And the modern
trend of state law expansions does nothing to make it easier for battered women to claim selfdefense. See discussion infra Section I.C (describing the ways that self-defense doctrine has
been expanded).
23 See discussion infra Section I.C (describing expansions).
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they legitimately feel threatened, to use violence to police their own
realms. But these laws do not send a uniform signal to all actors. For
White people living in White spaces—who can expect not to be feared
by others in the course of everyday life and who appear to belong in
White spaces—a robust right of self-defense suggests that it is desirable
to protect one’s home and neighborhood from intruders. 24 For Black
people in White spaces, whose bodies carry the weight of cultural myths
about danger and criminality and who may at any time be viewed as
suspicious, threatening, 25 or out of place 26 by their neighbors, selfdefense laws are a reminder that the law condones, and even
encourages, fear-based violence against them. The laws create a
framework that legitimates White fear of a stranger who looks racially
out-of-place and condones violence based on that fear. This framework
in turn helps normalize neighbor-on-neighbor surveillance.
The cycle of fear, surveillance, and violence is also one that can be
abused. Even if a person is not actually threatened or afraid, she can
invoke the framework of fear based on racial out-of-placeness and can
expect that police or a jury will be sympathetic. By underscoring Black
vulnerability and White ownership, self-defense laws further inscribe
the racialized character of White neighborhoods in an era when
property laws no longer do so explicitly. 27
Part I of this Article considers the relationship between race and
self-defense law. First, it argues that stranger self-defense cases are
24 Several scholars have documented the way that Whites have employed private violence
against their Black neighbors to preserve White neighborhoods. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra
note 3, at 1171 (citing JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 54 (2013)); RICHARD
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 139–51 (2017). Although they acknowledge police indifference
to and encouragement of this violence, these scholars do not focus on self-defense law as an
important source of legal absolution.
25 See discussion infra Section I.B (describing how Blackness is viewed as threatening).
26 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1180 (describing how Trayvon Martin was viewed
as “stepping out of place” by being Black in a White neighborhood); I. Bennett Capers, Policing,
Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 65–66 (describing the role of “racial
incongruity” in police decisions to stop, question, and search people); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race
and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 226–27 (1983) (same).
27 Like the concept of Whiteness itself, White spaces are built on both “exclusion and
subordination,” see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1737
(1993), and both are accomplished when White residents surveille Black residents under a
looming threat of violence. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1180–82.
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always “about race” in the sense that they are about individual and
shared fear and are therefore uniformly vulnerable to widely-shared
racial biases. Second, it argues that laws that expand the right of selfdefense, from longstanding defense of habitation laws to more recently
adopted stand your ground and immunity laws, operate together to
make self-defense available in more situations and easier to claim than
the core doctrine might suggest. The expansion is also literal, especially
in the residential neighborhood context, in that these laws enlarge the
physical space one can legally protect using lethal force.
Part II explains how self-defense law can transform private fear
into state-sanctioned violence. First, the Article situates this claim in the
larger context of residential segregation, which has always been enforced
through cooperation between state and private actors, such that
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation is mostly imaginary.
Second, it considers the problem of new White spaces. These
neighborhoods cannot easily be linked to past state-sponsored
discrimination in property law or housing policy (e.g., legal segregation,
redlining, or racially restrictive covenants) because they post-date the
worst of those policies. To the extent that segregation is acknowledged,
it is attributed only to private preferences. Yet, these private preferences
are expressed in and enforced by neighbor-on-neighbor harassment,
profiling, and violence, with law as a primary tool of harassment. Third,
it argues that, by preemptively legalizing private home defense and
loudly signaling that legality with each new enactment, self-defense laws
sanction the most severe instances of private violence and offer a
framework that legitimates fear-based violence and encourages the
profiling and reporting that precedes that violence.
The purpose of this Article is to sketch the contours of an
important but undertheorized relationship between residential
segregation, private violence, and state criminal law. I hope it will draw
renewed attention to the importance of state substantive criminal law as
a site of racial subordination and a potential area for reform. More
specifically, I aim to highlight the central role of self-defense doctrine in
shielding, legalizing, and encouraging private racial violence. The
Article does not offer proposals for reform because determining which
reforms will be effective will require that states collect and make
available data on self-defense claims, and that legislatures carefully
weigh the harms and benefits of each change to self-defense law,
including harms that might weigh differently on different people. By
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explaining one such potential harm, I hope this Article invites a deeper
examination of the racial contingency of self-defense laws.
I. THE LEGALITY OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE
When two strangers encounter one another in a backyard or on a
neighborhood street, and one of them purposefully kills the other, selfdefense laws provide the standard for determining whether the killing
amounts to murder or manslaughter, or whether it is legally justified.
The basic principles of self-defense say that killing is only legally
justified if it is necessary to defend oneself against the threat of death or
serious injury. 28 In general, this means that the killer must have acted
out of reasonable fear, whether or not the fear turns out to be correct. 29
But these basic principles have been relaxed over time by laws that
expand the doctrine of justifiable homicide. 30 Several criminal law
scholars have pointed out that stand your ground laws have dubious
public safety benefits and a concerning potential for racial bias. 31 As this
Article explains, stand your ground laws are only one piece of a much
longer story about states strengthening the right of self-defense,
particularly in situations involving actual or suspected home intruders. 32
Defense of habitation laws, which permit the use of deadly force
against an intruder in the home—even absent clear evidence that the
intruder intends to harm anyone—and castle doctrine laws, which
provide that a person does not have to retreat before using deadly force
against a home intruder, are the law in nearly every state. 33 At least half
the states also have stand your ground laws that authorize the use of
See discussion infra Section I.A (describing the basic principles of self-defense).
2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 127 (15th ed. 2018). See, e.g., Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d
238, 239 (Nev. 1990); People v. Davis, 63 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1965).
30 See infra Section I.C.
31 See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Taking A Stand?: An Initial Assessment of the Social and Racial
Effects of Recent Innovations in Self-Defense Laws, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3179, 3180 (2015);
Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 827, 850–57 (2013).
32 See discussion infra Section I.C (describing how the core doctrine of self-defense has
been expanded over time).
33 See infra notes 149–55, 164–67, 183–85 and accompanying text (discussing defense of
habitation laws); 175–78 and accompanying text (discussing castle laws).
28
29
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deadly force against an aggressor in any place, such as a neighborhood
sidewalk, even when retreat is possible. 34 In recent years, many states
have passed laws that further expand the right of self-defense by making
it available in more situations and making it easier to claim and prove.
These include extending home defense rules to vehicles and workplaces,
establishing a presumption of justification every time a killer raises a
claim of self-defense, and providing immunity in civil suits arising out
of self-defense killings. 35 Often advanced in state legislatures as a
package, these laws permit an individual to use deadly force in defense
of a larger and larger swath of space—from his person, to his home, his
yard, and even to the streets of his neighborhood 36—and require less
and less evidence to substantiate the claimed fear. As an expressive
matter, expanded self-defense laws seem to validate and encourage
private violence in defense of body, home, and neighborhood.
Self-defense killings are a small subset of homicides overall, but
statistics suggest they are an important category and that they operate in
a particular way. According to the only nationally available data source
on homicide trends37 collected by the U.S. Department of Justice’s
Bureau of Justice Statistics, there were several hundred self-defense
killings by private actors each year between 1980 and 2008. 38 Self-

34

laws).

See infra notes 138–42, 181–82 and accompanying text (discussing stand your ground

35 See Elizabeth Megale, Deadly Combinations: How Self-Defense Laws Pairing Immunity
with a Presumption of Fear Allows Criminals to Get Away with Murder, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
105 (2010) (describing immunity laws).
36 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 18 (manuscript at 5, 26).
37 The federal government maintains two datasets that can be used to track justifiable
homicides. Fatal injury reports, collected by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
would include all deaths, regardless of the killer’s claim or the legal outcome. Homicide data,
collected from state and local law enforcement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
distinguishes between culpable killings (murder/manslaughter) and justifiable homicides. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATION’S TWO MEASURES OF
HOMICIDE
(July
2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ntmh.pdf
[http://
perma.cc/V7UM-WAND]. The FBI, whose Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and Supplemental
Homicide Reports are the basis for most studies of self-defense disparities, defines justifiable
homicide to include a narrow category of killings that occur during a listed felony that has been
separately reported. UCR Offense Definitions, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING STATS., https://
www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm [https://perma.cc/J6JG-FYGE] (last updated Jan. 26, 2017).
38 ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ-236018, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008 32 (2011), https://
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defense killings by private actors increased between 2000 and 2008. 39
Despite this increase, the number of justifiable homicides by private
citizens was still much lower in 2008 than it was in 1980. 40
Most civilian self-defense killings (55%) involved a person
interrupting a crime in progress, 41 and a substantial minority (41%)
involved someone responding to an attack. 42 The vast majority of
justifiable homicides are committed with firearms. 43
Federal data does not capture the full scope of self-defense
killings. 44 It is based on voluntary reporting of crimes known to law
enforcement by state and local law enforcement agencies. 45 Reports do
not present justifiable homicides as a percentage of homicides in which
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf [http://perma.cc/K75V-36ZC]. National homicide
data comes from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. Id. at 34.
39 COOPER & SMITH, supra note 38, at 32.
40 Id. The number of justifiable homicides by police, on the other hand, has decreased only
slightly since 1980. Id.
41 Id. at 32.
42 Id.
43 Expanded Homicide Data Table 15: Justifiable Homicide by Weapon, Private Citizen,
2011–2015, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-inthe-u.s.-2015/tables/expanded_homicide_data_table_15_justifiable_homicide_by_weapon_
private_citizen_2011-2015.xls [https://perma.cc/RCM4-KYYF] (last visited Mar. 21, 2019); see
also VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., FIREARM JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES AND NON-FATAL SELF-DEFENSE
GUN USE 4 (2017) http://www.vpc.org/studies/justifiable17.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZZ6-VY6X]
(firearms were used in over 80% of justifiable homicides in 2014).
44 Researchers have raised various questions about the utility of the UCR and
Supplementary Homicide Reports as a measure of self-defense killings. See, e.g., Daniel Lathrop
& Anna Flagg, Killings of Black Men by Whites are Far More Likely to be Ruled “Justifiable”,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 14, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/14/
killings-of-black-men-by-whites-are-far-more-likely-to-be-ruled-justifiable [https://perma.cc/
54XU-9PK6] (describing how UCR data may not include determinations made by prosecutors,
who are not required to report their data); P.H. BLACKMAN & R.E. GARDINER, FLAWS IN THE
FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS REGARDING HOMICIDE AND WEAPONS USE (1984) (suggesting
that the UCR may under-report justifiable homicides); accord Howard E. Williams, Scott W.
Bowman & Jordan Taylor Jung, The Limitations of Government Databases for Analyzing Fatal
Officer-Involved Shootings in the United States, 30 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 201 (2016) (outlining
similar shortcomings with UCR data collection for officer-involved shootings).
45 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-247060, THE NATION’S TWO
MEASURES OF HOMICIDE 2 (2014). The data reflects the initial determination made by law
enforcement, not subsequent decisions of prosecutors, courts, or coroners. Id. Whether a selfdefense killing will be included in homicide data, as opposed to just fatal injury data, and
whether the its classification will correspond with the legal outcome, depends in large part on
how state and local agencies collect and report their data.
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self-defense was claimed, or include updates if the determination
changes later in the legal process. The data thus does not tell us how
often self-defense claims are successful. It also does not include location
information.
A congressional review of the limited federal homicide data from
2001–2010 revealed that killings of Black people by White people were
ruled justified 35% of the time. 46 Killings of White people by Black
people were ruled justifiable in only 3% of cases. 47 Further analysis
confirms that White on Black homicides are most likely to be ruled
justified, while Black on White homicides are least likely to be ruled
justified. 48 In cases involving two male strangers and a firearm, the
overall rate of justified homicides is higher, and the racial disparity is
also greater. 49 A study by the Marshall Project found that killings of

46 Memorandum from William J. Krouse & Matt Deaton, Cong. Research Serv., to Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, on Supplementary Homicide Report Data on Black and White InterRacial Justifiable Homicides in Comparison (2001–2010) (Sept. 16, 2013), https://
www.scribd.com/document/179956006/Inter-Racial-Justifiable-Homcides-Memo-9-16-2013pdf.
47 Id. These numbers reflect only stranger-on-stranger homicides by involving firearms. FBI
data was not collected from all states in all years. Id. at 2.
48 JOHN K. ROMAN, URBAN INST., RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND STAND YOUR
GROUND LAWS: ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 6 (2013); AM. BAR
ASS’N, NAT’L TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS, A REVIEW OF THE PRELIMINARY
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 20 (2014) (citing ROMAN, supra). But see Some Notes on John
Roman’s “Race, Unjustifiable Homicide, and Stand Your Ground Laws: Analysis of FBI
Supplementary Homicide Report Data,” Urban Institute, CRIME PREVENTION RES. CTR. (Nov. 4,
2013),
https://crimeresearch.org/2013/11/some-notes-on-john-romans-race-justifiablehomicide-and-stand-your-ground-laws-analysis-of-fbi-supplementary-homicide-report-dataurban-institute [https://perma.cc/YE6B-WCTH] (critiquing some aspects of Roman’s
methodology).
49 ROMAN, supra note 48, at 9 (finding the overall rate of justifiable homicides is “almost six
times higher” in cases involving two male strangers and a gun and that, among such cases,
White-on-Black homicides “have justifiable findings 33 percentage points more often” than
Black-on-White homicides). In male stranger cases, controlling for other variables, Roman
found that

[T]he odds a white-on-black homicide is found justified is 281 percent greater than
the odds a white-on-white homicide is found justified. By contrast, a black-on-white
homicide has barely half the odds of being ruled justifiable relative to white-on-white
homicides. Statistically, black-on-black homicides have the same odds of being ruled
justifiable as white-on-white homicides.
Id.
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Black men by White people (including private and police killings) were
eight times more likely to be found justifiable than any other
combination. 50
Between 1980 and 2008, a majority of the people killed by private
actors (59%) were non-White. To compare, a majority of the people
killed by police in self-defense (60%) were White. 51 (This number, of
course, says nothing about whether the rates at which Whites and nonWhites are victims of police killing are proportional to population).
While questions about “justifiable” police killings of Black people
abound in the public discourse, these statistics suggest the law of private
self-defense may also be responsible for legitimating Black deaths. 52
While the numbers tell us little about the circumstances that led to each
individual killing, they should at least raise questions about the role of
racial bias in private self-defense law.
Trayvon Martin’s death by George Zimmerman’s bullet did raise
these questions for some, leading to critiques of the expanded selfdefense law that had been enacted by the Florida legislature a few years
before Martin was killed, and of similar laws enacted by other states. 53
Emphasis on relatively recent reforms implies that, without them, selfdefense law would be race neutral. However, even without expansion
laws, the focus on reasonable fear embedded in the law of self-defense
means that it is inherently vulnerable to racial bias. Some of the most
See Lathrop & Flagg, supra note 44.
COOPER & SMITH, supra note 38, at 33 tbl.14.
52 For a thorough analysis of the limited data available on the racial effects of expanded selfdefense laws and a discussion of the need for more and better data, see Barnes, supra note 31, at
3192–98.
53 See, e.g., Jamiles Lartey, Why the Days of ‘Stand Your Ground’ Self-Defense Laws May be
Numbered, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/07/
why-the-days-of-stand-your-ground-self-defense-laws-may-be-numbered
[https://perma.cc/
BWH9-7SVG]; David A. Love, ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws Encourage Racially Charged Violence,
CNN (Aug. 3, 2018, 10:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/03/opinions/stand-yourground-law-racial-violence-opinion-love/index.html [https://perma.cc/STE7-9MFA]; John
Bacon, ‘People Emboldened’: Stand Your Ground Laws Face New Scrutiny; George Zimmerman’s
Lawyer Isn’t a Fan, USA TODAY (July 26, 2018, 4:43 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2018/07/26/stand-your-ground-laws-renewed-scrutiny-florida-shooting/
840272002 [https://perma.cc/9U2B-W83U]; Mike Spies, Black Politicians are Fighting a Stand
Your Ground Resurgence, HUFFPOST (Apr. 4, 2017, 9:36 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/black-politicians-are-fighting-a-stand-your-ground_us_58fdfbe1e4b0f420ad99c9e4
[https://perma.cc/YNL6-JYQV]; see also sources cited supra note 48.
50
51
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significant doctrines that strengthen the right to self-defense, thereby
legalizing more deaths, are not recent at all. The legality of DeMarcus
Carter’s killing, for example, likely hinged on Nevada’s century-old selfdefense and defense of habitation statutes. 54 Recent expansions might
worsen the problem, but they did not create it, so repealing expansion
laws will not solve it.
Rather, the potential for racial bias is built into the core doctrine of
self-defense. This is because the question of whether private violence is
justifiable, and therefore legal, centers on whether the killer feared the
victim and whether that fear was reasonable. 55 While many Americans
expressly disavow racial bias, our psychological processes and cultural
myths reveal an association between Blackness and threat. 56 Mapped
onto bodies, this tendency means that individuals may be more likely to
fear Black strangers, and police, prosecutors, judges, and juries may be
more likely to understand that fear as reasonable. Instead of arguing
over whether race played a role in Martin’s death and Zimmerman’s
trial, 57 we might instead begin from the presumption that all stranger
self-defense cases are at least in part “about race.”
The law of self-defense has broadened over time, with common law
and statutory developments rendering violence justifiable in more
circumstances, insulating more killings from review, particularly those
that occur in the context of home defense. 58 Rules that expand the right
of self-defense in and around the home are premised on long held
54 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120(1) (West 2019). The statute was enacted in 1911 and was
amended in 1983 to add the word “surreptitious.” See Runion v. State, 13 P.3d 52, 56 n.2 (Nev.
2000) (finding that “Nevada’s self-defense statutory framework has existed for over seventy
years” and noting 1983 amendment).
55 See infra Section I.A.
56 See infra Section I.B.
57 See Frederick M. Lawrence, To What Extent Did Race Play a Role in the Death of Trayvon
Martin, HUFFPOST (July 29, 2013, 6:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frederick-mlawrence/to-what-extent-did-race-p_b_3659014.html
[http://perma.cc/LHF6-2FPK]
(describing the role of race as a “key question” that persisted for many people in the wake of the
trial). Attorneys involved in the case similarly asserted that the case was not about race. See Lisa
Bloom, Zimmerman Prosecutors Duck the Race Issue, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2013/07/16/opinion/zimmerman-prosecutors-duck-the-race-issue.html?mcubz=2
[http://perma.cc/7NLS-W6LF] (describing how the prosecutor in closing arguments insisted
that the case was “not about race” and noted that this language “mirrored” public statements by
Martin’s family’s attorney, Benjamin Crump, that the case “shouldn’t be about race”).
58 See infra Section I.C.
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beliefs about the right and duty of White men to protect the sanctity of
their houses and the safety of their families. 59 The same themes resonate
today as a desire to protect suburban neighborhood from the possibility
of encroaching crime, with special concern for women home alone. As a
result, state criminal laws legalize private violence in a variety of
circumstances and covering a broad swath of space in and around
residential neighborhoods. 60 Some expansions represent thoughtful
responses to the perceived narrowness of core self-defense doctrine,
while others seem to do little more than signal to fearful residents that
they are entitled to use lethal violence to protect their homes, cars,
boats, unoccupied houses, and neighborhoods against intruders. 61
To elucidate the relationship between racial fear, place, and selfdefense doctrine, I first describe what I refer to as “core” self-defense
doctrine: the idea that force is only justifiable if the user reasonably
believes that he faces an imminent threat, that the force is proportional
to the harm threatened, and that force is necessary to avoid the
threatened harm. Relying on psychological research on implicit bias, as
well as sociological scholarship on the cultural meaning of Blackness, I
then argue that stranger self-defense cases are always “about race” to
some degree, and that this fact should be acknowledged. Third, I analyze
laws that expand the right of self-defense, including longstanding rules
like defense of habitation and more recent innovations like criminal and
civil immunity. I focus on the way that each rule relaxes one or more of
the basic common law requirements for self-defense to underscore that
all these laws are simply different variations on the same theme. 62 While
data on the application and outcome of state self-defense laws is quite

See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section II.C.
61 See infra Section I.C.4.
62 The criminal law doctrines governing defensive use of force are sometimes taught as a
collection of different rules, such as defense of self, defense of others, defense of property,
defense of habitation, and stand your ground. The better approach, in my view, is to focus on
the basic elements required for justifiable defensive use of force and how each discrete rule
expresses or modifies these basic elements. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
IN CRIMINAL LAW 97–98 (1997) (“[S]elf-defence, defence of others, and defence of property are
often defined separately. But this need not be the case. Their shared function and underlying
principle means that one could formulate a single defensive force provision . . . .”).
59
60
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limited, it raises significant questions about whether expanded selfdefense laws worsen the built-in racial bias.
A.

The Basic Principles of Self-Defense

Killing another human being is illegal under most circumstances.
In every state today, and under English common law, intentional killing
is punishable by the most severe consequences, including death or life in
prison. 63 The legal principles that permit the use of deadly force in selfdefense present a very limited exception to the rule that killing is illegal.
These principles dictate that, if deadly force is necessary to preserve
one’s own life or the life of another person, the killing is justifiable. 64 In
other words, it is not a crime at all. The fact that self-defense is a
justification, as opposed to an excuse, is significant. When an act is
considered legally justifiable, the message is that the defendant’s actions
were not merely understandable but also desirable under the
circumstances. 65 In the case of justifiable homicide in self-defense, the
law expresses the idea that the death of the original aggressor is
preferred over the death of the person being attacked. 66 A justifiable
homicide is a killing that any person would have—perhaps should
have—committed under the same circumstances.

63 See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241, 1247
(2011).
64 FIONA LEVERICK, KILLING IN SELF-DEFENCE 2 (2006); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC
CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 132–38 (1998); George P. Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in
FLETCHER’S ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL LAW 174 (Russell L. Christopher ed., 2013); ROBINSON, supra
note 62, at 96.
65 LEVERICK, supra note 64, at 13, 17–19; H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 13 (2d ed. 2008) (justifiable conduct is “something which
the law does not condemn, or even welcomes”); BOAZ SANGERO, SELF-DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL
LAW 18 (2006) (explaining the views of Robinson and Fletcher regarding the morality and
social desirability of a justified act).
66 See Claire O. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 621, 640
(1996) (contrasting the criminal law’s treatment of killings of aggressors with that of killings of
innocent bystanders). But see George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and
Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 562 (1996) (focusing on the motivation of the killer, rather than
the lack of social harm wrought by the killing, and pointing out that self-defense is available
even against an excused attacker).
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A person is justified in using force only if he honestly and
reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger and force is necessary
to avoid the danger. 67 Even then, the force used must be proportional to
the threat. 68 These four elements—imminence of threat, necessity,
proportionality, and reasonableness—form the legal bounds of
traditional self-defense doctrine. 69 Imminence means that the defendant
must have been in fear of immediate harm. 70 Necessity means that force
must be the only option left. 71 If safe retreat or de-escalation is available,
force may not be used. 72 Proportionality means that deadly force may
only be used to defend against a deadly or similarly grave threat. 73
67 I use the masculine pronoun because traditional self-defense doctrine references the
behavior of a reasonable man. But see LEE, supra note 20, at 204–12 (describing the evolution
from reasonable man to reasonable person). See also Suk, supra note 20, at 243–46 (describing
the role of masculinity in the evolution of home defense and no retreat rules); Mary Anne
Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered Women’s
Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1110–11 (2014)
(explaining how the castle doctrine and no retreat rules carve out defensive violence as “a
privilege primarily reserved for men”).
68 See WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, § 127 (a person may kill in self-defense if
“he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily
harm.”); State v. Comisford, 168 P. 287 (Nev. 1917) (the law “confers upon [the defendant] the
right to exercise his judgment as a reasonable man in determining, at the time, whether, from
all the attendant circumstances and conditions, it was necessary to strike the fatal blow for the
protection of his own life.”).
69 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 221–22 (6th ed. 2012) (describing
common law requirements); see LEE, supra note 20, at 127–32. Robinson describes the
requirements for defensive use of force as “triggering conditions” (imminent unlawful threat),
plus two limits on the scope of the response (necessity and proportionality). ROBINSON, supra
note 62, at 99. Lee lists one additional requirement: the defendant may not be the “initial
aggressor.” LEE, supra note 20, at 127–32. This limitation is certainly part of the network of
common law rules governing self-defense, but I characterize it here as an application of the
necessity principle in the sense that an aggressor is required to take the alternative option of not
starting the fight in the first place. See infra notes 172–82 and accompanying text.
70 See ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 99.
71 Id. at 99 (“The necessity requirement demands that the defendant act only when and to
the extent necessary to protect or further the interest at stake . . . [and use] only the degree of
force that is necessary for self-protection.”).
72 Id.
73 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 135–36 (1998) (describing
proportionality requirement as requiring that “the harm done in disabling the aggressor must
not be excessive or disproportionate relative to the harm threatened and likely to result from
the attack” so deadly force might be used to ward off rape, but not a lesser intrusion into bodily
autonomy or a petty theft); see also ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 99. A strict application of the

Rolnick.40.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

1660

5/17/2019 10:04 AM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1639

A person may be legally justified in using deadly force even if he is
mistaken about the threat. 74 The defendant’s fear, and his assessment of
the threat’s imminence and the necessity of force, must be based on an
honest and reasonable belief that he is in danger. 75 If the fear is not
genuine, or not reasonable, the defendant may be convicted of murder.
The reasonableness requirement, traceable at least to the early 1800s,
extends the justification to circumstances where the victim did not
actually pose a threat, as long as a hypothetical reasonable man would
have made the same assessment of threat. 76 Although modern courts are
more likely to articulate it as a reasonable person standard, the roots of
proportionality requirement would deny the defendant the privilege of using deadly force to
protect property, even as a result the defendant is forced to surrender property to a thief. “But
such commitment to proportionality—as in the valuation of human life over property alone,
even the life of a law-breaker—is the mark of a civilized society.” Id. at 100; see also SANGERO,
supra note 65, at 181 (“There is absolutely no room in a civilised society to justify the rescue of
property at the price of human life, not even at the price of the aggressor’s life.”) In the strictest
sense, deadly force can only be used to defend against a person who is threatening death.
However, English and American laws have long permitted the use of deadly force as a defense
against some potential harms that are considered quite serious, but fall short of a threat of
death, such as to defend against an attack on the home, or to stop a violent felony in progress. I
describe these rules, even the longstanding ones, as expansions to the core idea of self-defense
in order to focus on how they relax or eliminate the core requirements. See discussion infra
Section I.C.
74 See, e.g., Pineda v. State, 88 P.3d 827, 833 (2004) (“[A] reasonably perceived apparent
danger as well as actual danger entitles a defendant to an instruction on self-defense.”);
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, § 127; ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 100–02
(explaining that the dominant “reasons” theory of self-defense focuses only on the defendant’s
reason for acting, which turns on what the defendant believes at the time, without regard to the
correctness of the belief, but advocating instead for a “deeds” approach, which would focus on
“whether or not the conduct was something that we are content to have others perform under
the justifying circumstances and to have others perform under similar circumstances in the
future,” so the defendant’s reasons for acting are irrelevant and a mistaken belief would result,
at most, in an excuse defense).
75 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, § 127. The Model Penal Code’s (MPC) selfdefense provision requires only a genuine perception of immediate danger, eliminating the
reasonableness requirement. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).
76 Stephanie M. Wildman & Delores A. Donovan, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete?: A
Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 443–44 (1981)
(citing H.A. Snelling, Killing in Self-Defence, 34 AUST. L.J. 130, 134 (1960)). Prior to the
widespread adoption of the reasonableness requirement, the right of self-defense was even
broader because most states allowed even an unreasonable mistaken belief in the need for force
to provide a justification. Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II–Honest but
Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 479–86 (1987).

Rolnick.40.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

5/17/2019 10:04 AM

DEFENDING WHITE SPACE

1661

reasonableness in self-defense, as in other areas of criminal law, are
gender and race specific. 77 Some states incorporate a rule of “imperfect
self-defense,” under which a defendant who makes an honest, but
unreasonable, mistake about the need for deadly force has a defense to
murder but not to manslaughter. 78
Because self-defense is an affirmative defense, states may require
the defendant to produce evidence to support a claim of self-defense
and to persuade a jury of the claim’s validity. 79 In a prosecution for
intentional killing, the state must prove the elements of murder beyond
a reasonable doubt. 80 The state need not, however, prove the absence of
justification. Instead, in order to get a jury instruction on self-defense,
the defendant must present evidence sufficient to establish the
defendant’s reasonable belief as to the existence of the core elements of
the defense. At common law, the defendant also had to convince a jury
by a preponderance of the evidence of the validity of his self-defense
claim. 81 States today may require the prosecution to disprove selfdefense beyond a reasonable doubt once the defense is raised, 82 but a

See Wildman & Donovan, supra note 76, at 436–37; LEE, supra note 20, at 203–04.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.11 (West 2019); People v. Koontz, 46 P.3d 335 (Cal. 2002)
(applying imperfect self-defense rule in California). Under the MPC, a defendant who makes a
reckless or negligent mistake, however, may still be convicted of manslaughter. The net effect
under both approaches is the same: a reasonable (non-negligent) mistake still results in a
complete defense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(4) (2009).
Nevada courts have not adopted this approach. See Hill v. State, 647 P.2d 370 (Nev. 1982).
79 See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987) (upholding Ohio law that placed the burden
of production and persuasion on the defendant claiming self-defense). But see H.B. 228, 132nd
Gen. Assemb. § 2901.05(B)(1) (Ohio 2019) (passed over Governor’s veto, Dec. 27, 2018)
(placing the burden of proof in alleged self-defense cases on the government if “evidence [is]
presented that tends to support” self-defense).
80 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (constitution requires that the prosecution
prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt).
81 See Martin, 480 U.S. at 235.
82 See id. at 236. Nevada statutory law provides that
77
78

[T]he burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the
homicide, will devolve on the accused, unless the proof on the part of the prosecution
sufficiently manifests that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or
that the accused was justified, or excused in committing the homicide.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.170 (West 2019). Nevada courts, however, disallow jury instructions
based on this provision in murder trials because such instructions “may cause the jury to
conclude that the prosecution does not have the burden of persuasion throughout the trial to
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defendant must still present some evidence to establish self-defense, and
the claim will usually go a jury. 83
The traditional substantive and procedural requirements for selfdefense provided a dual layer of protection against false or disingenuous
self-defense claims. First, requiring the defendant to support a selfdefense claim in court (even if only by producing evidence) helps to
weed out fabricated claims. Second, the substantive requirement of
reasonableness helps to guard against claims of justification that do not
accord with what society (as embodied in the jury) believes to be
justifiable. Unreasonable self-defense claims would include those not
really based on fear, as well as those based on genuine, but socially
aberrational, fear.
Through self-defense doctrine, criminal laws condone death,
expressing a societal preference for the death of the assailant over the
death of the victim. The core substantive requirements, along with the
procedural rules governing defense of justification, help to keep this
exception narrow. Together they establish that a killing is justifiable
prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt[,] i.e., to believe incorrectly that,
on the issue of self-defense, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant.” Robertson v.
State, 625 P.2d 565, 565–56 (Nev. 1981). It is not immediately clear what effect, if any, the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Martin v. Ohio had on Nevada law in this area. Eugene
Volokh argued that nearly all states today require the prosecution to prove the absence of
justification beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant introduces any evidence of selfdefense, although he acknowledges that “[t]he English common law rule at the time of the
Framing was that the defense must prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Eugene Volokh, Burden and Quantum of Proof as to Self-Defense, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July
14,
2013),
http://volokh.com/2013/07/14/burden-and-quantum-of-proof-on-self-defense
[http://perma.cc/F9SP-B7KW] (claiming that Florida’s 2005 provision was in line with the
practice of most states, contrary to what other commentators had claimed). See also GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 197 (1988)
(describing the prosecution’s burden to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt and
highlighting the importance of this in the criminal trial of Bernard Goetz).
83 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 132 (2018). See, e.g., Greedy v. State, 64
N.E.3d 1263, 2016 WL 5394460 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2016) (unpublished disposition)
(describing Nebraska’s rule that the defendant bears the burden of production for self-defense
and contrasting it with the rules for mitigation defenses, which require only that the defendant
raise the issue). Of course, prosecutorial discretion would permit a decision not to file homicide
charges in a case where the self-defense evidence is particularly strong. See Robert J. Smith &
Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 806–07 (explaining that the prosecutor’s role is to assess
the strength of a possible self-defense claim and decide whether to bring charges and asserting
that implicit racial bias may color that assessment).
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only when a person has no other option besides dying or being seriously
injured at the hands of an assailant. Yet, in most states, the law of selfdefense is actually much broader. The doctrines that expand these core
principles are described in Section I.C. First, however, it is important to
examine the relationship between race and fear that permeates even the
basic rules.
B.

Blackness and Fear

Self-defense law legalizes violence perpetrated in response to a
perceived threat, as long as the perception is reasonable (that is, it would
be shared by others). In encounters between strangers, this means
relying on easy to ascertain cues, such as a what the person looks like,
what he is wearing, where he is, what he appears to be doing, and
whether he seems like he might be holding or reaching for a weapon, as
well as one’s sense of unease or danger. Doctrinally, it is difficult to
eliminate this reliance on subjective threat assessment. 84 We want to
allow people to defend themselves against people who might otherwise
kill them. 85 Forcing every defendant to wait until the threat of death is
84 Several scholars have suggested doctrinal modifications or theoretical approaches that
would more carefully limit self-defense to situations in which the defendant is certain and
correct regarding the nature of the threat. Fletcher argues that a defendant facing a real threat
to life may be justified in killing the aggressor, whereas a defendant who kills out of a mistaken
belief that he faces a threat is not justified but might be excused. George P. Fletcher, The
Psychotic Aggressor: A Generation Later, in FLETCHER’S ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL LAW 202 (Russell
L. Christopher ed., 2013) (“The jury should first find and declare to the public that a defendant
like Bernhard Goetz . . . acted unjustifiably and wrongly in using force against someone who
was not actually engaged in attacking them as required by the law of self-defense. Then, as a
second stage of the proceedings, the jury should be able to declare the defendant[] excused on
the grounds of reasonable misperception of danger.”); Richardson & Goff, supra note 21,
propose a doctrinal regime in which killing in response to a correct assessment of threat would
be justified and would be a complete defense, but killing in response to a mistaken belief that
was premised on racial fear would have only a partial defense (i.e., a charge of murder would
become voluntary manslaughter).
85 LEVERICK, supra note 62, at 66 (“[K]illing in self-defence is permissible because all
human beings possess a right to life and an aggressor threatens to violate this right . . . . The
reason the victim is permitted to kill the aggressor, but the aggressor is not permitted to kill the
victim, is that the aggressor, by virtue of her conduct in becoming an unjust and immediate
threat to the life of the victim that cannot be avoided by any less harmful means, forfeits her
right to life”); ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 97 (“Society’s interest in maintaining the right to
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crystal clear would likely result in more innocent people dying at the
hands of aggressors before they are able to fully determine whether the
threat is real, and thus, their act justifiable. In many situations, selfdefense requires a split-second assessment of danger, and therefore the
law tolerates a risk of mistakes. The potential for mistakes and varied
judgment, however, does not unfold on a neutral stage.
Because our collective sense of threat is racially contingent, the
potential for racial bias is built into self-defense law. 86 Black people, and
others whose physical characteristics are associated with danger (tall
people, muscular people, men), are more vulnerable to being assessed as
threatening. 87 This is a statement of fact, not a criticism. Race neutral
rules can perpetuate racial inequality because historical and social
biases, and existing inequality, are built into them. 88 Acknowledging
bodily integrity, when combined with the physical harm threatened, outweighs the harm
inflicted to stop the aggression.”); SANGERO, supra note 65, at 44 (“[T]he aggressor, by his
guilty act, loses his right to life, or, at least, the right to claim this right.”)
86 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 20, at 103; Richardson & Goff, supra note 21.
87 Masculine characteristics may also signal a threat, see, e.g., E. Ashby Plant, Joanna
Goplen & Jonathan W. Kunstman, Selective Responses to Threat: The Role of Race and Gender
in Decisions to Shoot, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1274 (2011) (finding that all
participants in simulation showed bias in favor of shooting White men and away from shooting
White women, and that White participants showed bias in favor of shooting Black men and
away from shooting Black women), and there is some evidence that the intersection of gender
and racial stereotypes make Black men especially vulnerable to being seen as physically
threatening. John Wilson, Kurt Hugenberg & Nicholas Rule, Racial Bias in Judgments of
Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat, 113 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 59
(2017) The problem of racialized perception of danger, however, is not just a male problem.
There is evidence that Black women and girls are more likely than their White counterparts to
be perceived as older and less innocent. Compare REBECCA EPSTEIN, JAMILIA L. BLAKE &
THALIA GONZALEZ, GIRLHOOD INTERRUPTED: THE ERASURE OF BLACK GIRLS’ CHILDHOOD
(2017), with Wilson, Hugenberg & Rule, supra, at 59 (finding that people tend to perceive Black
men, especially darker-skinned Black men, as larger and more threatening than similarly sized
White men); Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526 (2014). This perception affects their
involvement in the criminal justice system, especially whether they are treated as victims or
criminals. Priscilla Ocen, (E)racing Childhood: Examining the Racialized Construction of
Childhood and Innocence in the Treatment of Sexually Exploited Minors, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1586
(2015).
88 For detailed accounts of how neutral rules perpetuate structural inequality, see generally
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLORBLIND RACISM AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (5th ed. 2018); DARIA ROITHMAYR,
REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014); Ian
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that a neutral rule might affect a Black victim differently from a White
victim allows us to better ground theoretical assessments of criminal law
and the reality of how it is applied.
1.

Psychological Anti-Blackness

Decades of social science research on unconscious bias has
established that anti-Blackness is pervasive in American society,
including a negative association with Blackness, 89 a preference for White
over Black, 90 and an association between Blackness and criminality.91
Blackness in this context is what Jerry Kang calls a “racial schema,” or “a
set of [socially created] racial categories into which we map an
individual . . . according to prevailing rules of racial mapping,”
triggering “implicit and explicit racial meanings associated with that
Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012). See also Andrea Freeman,
Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017) (credit); Daria Roithmayr,
Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000) (law
school admissions).
89 See, e.g., Adam L. Alter, Chadly Stern, Yael Granot & Emily Balcetis, The “Bad Is Black”
Effect: Why People Believe Evildoers have Darker Skin than Do-Gooders, 42 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1653 (2015).
90 See, e.g., Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting
Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS:
THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 101, 105–06 (2002) (reviewing data from web-based administration of
the Implicit Association Test and finding implicit preference for White over Black, strongly
among White subjects and more weakly among Black subjects).
91 See, e.g., Andrew R. Todd, Kelsey Thiem & Rebecca Neal, Does Seeing Faces of Young
Black Boys Facilitate the Identification of Threatening Stimuli?, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 384 (2016)
(finding that White participants had less difficulty identifying threatening stimuli and more
difficulty identifying non-threatening stimuli after seeing Black faces and that the association
between Blackness and criminality occurred even if the faces shown were young Black
children); Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing
Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881, 883,
887–88 (2004) (finding that Black faces increased subjects’ likelihood of seeing crime-relevant
objects, subjects primed to think about crime paid more attention to Black faces, and finding
the same results among police officers as among undergraduates). Researchers have also
identified a persistent association between Black people and apes, echoing historical stereotypes
used to dehumanize Black people, and shown that this association can influence criminal
sentencing determinations and encourage violence against Black people. Phillip Atiba Goff,
Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Melissa J. Williams & Matthew Christian Jackson, Not Yet Human:
Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 304–05 (2008).
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category.”92 This mapping is often based on the visual cues we typically
associate with race, such as skin color, but it may also be based on
performative traits 93 or non-visual cues. 94
Social psychologists have documented negative implicit
associations attached to Blackness using the Implicit Association Test
(IAT). 95 The IAT tests the degree to which people associate two
concepts. The subject is shown one of two types of images (e.g.,
flowers/insects and positive/negative) and asked to hit a key to
categorize the image. 96 When the available categories are consistent with
widely-held stereotypes (e.g., “flower or positive word” versus “insect or
negative word”), the test subjects react quickly. 97 When the categories
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499 (2005). The meanings
triggered by racial schemas may include cognitive responses (stereotypes) and affective
responses (prejudices). Id. at 1500. As Kang explains, schematic thinking operates automatically
and is a necessary part of cognition:
92

Our senses are constantly bombarded by environmental stimuli, which must be
processed, then encoded into memories (short- and/or long-term) in some internal
representation. Based on that representation of reality, we must respond. But we
drown in information. Perforce we simplify the datastream at every stage of
information processing through the use of schemas. Different schema types exist for
different types of entities, such as objects, other people, the self, roles, and events. To
be clear, this most basic process operates not only on inanimate objects, such as
chairs or bananas, but also on human beings. When we encounter a person, we
classify that person into numerous social categories, such as gender, (dis)ability, age,
race, and role.
Id. at 1499 (internal citations omitted).
93 See DEVON CARBADO AND MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE: RETHINKING RACE IN A “POSTRACIAL AMERICA” (2013) (explaining how performative characteristics such as clothing, accent,
or hairstyle can determine whether a person is seen as Black and also “how Black” she is
perceived to be).
94 See OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE
BLIND 55 (2014); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 991, 997–1002 (2004).
95 Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring
Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1473–76 (1998), http://faculty.fortlewis.edu/burke_b/Senior/BLINK%
20replication/IAT.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBS5-WF2T].
96 Id. at 1465–66; Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The
Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, in AUTOMATIC
PROCESSES IN SOCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 265–92 (J. A. Bargh ed., 2007).
97 Nosek, Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 96, at 267.
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are schema-inconsistent (e.g., “flower or negative word” versus “insect
or positive word,” the subjects react slowly. As the test’s creators
explain, “[t]he logic of the IAT is that this sorting task should be easier
when the two concepts that share a response are strongly associated
than when they are weakly associated.” 98 Blackness, for many people, is
more strongly associated with negative words and ideas.
2.

Bias and Behavior

Life is not a lab experiment. In any real-life encounter between two
strangers, a person’s assessment of threat and determination of how to
react to that threat are likely to be based on more than just racial bias.
But the overwhelming weight of current evidence reveals a shared
tendency to associate Blackness with threat. Self-defense cases involve a
split-second assessment of whether a stranger poses a deadly threat. To
make such a determination, a person can rely only on limited easy-tosee cues, such as skin color, apparent gender, style of dress, location, and
environment. Race is an irrevocable part of this mix of cues. Perceptions
about race can also influence a person’s assessment of seemingly neutral
factors, such as whether the person appears to have a weapon and
whether that person seems to be engaged in criminal or dangerous
behavior at the moment.
Social scientists have also demonstrated that unconscious biases
translate into behavior. In several studies, research subjects were shown
a photo of a person and then asked to make a snap judgment about the
identity of an object. Participants in the study were more likely to
mistakenly think the object was a gun if they had been shown an image
of a Black face. 99 In so-called “shooter bias” studies, participants are
asked to quickly determine whether a person in an image is holding a
gun or a wallet, and to make a simulated decision about whether to
shoot the person in a video game-like setting. Participants in these
studies are more likely to mistake a wallet for a gun and to shoot the
98 Id.; see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association
Test: I. An Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCHOL. 197 (2003).
99 See Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing, and Lethal Force: Remedying Shooter Bias with Martial
Arts Training, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 152–60 (2016) (reviewing nearly two decades
of shooter bias studies).
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image when the face in the image is Black. 100 Because these biases are
unconscious, they cannot be reduced or eliminated simply through a
conscious attempt not to be racist. 101
These biases may be worse in cross-racial encounters because
people also tend to respond more negatively to anyone who is in an outgroup. 102 They are not, however, limited to cross-racial encounters. 103
Black people are at greater risk of being perceived as a threat, regardless
of who is making the assessment. 104 In terms of self-defense law, this
100 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004); B. Keith Payne, Weapons Bias: Split Second
Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287 (2006). But
see Lois James, Bryan Vila & Kenn Daratha, Results from Experimental Trials Testing
Participant Responses to White, Hispanic and Black Suspects in High-Fidelity Deadly Force
Judgment and Decision-Making Simulations, 9. J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 189, 196
(2013); Lois James, David Klinger & Bryan Vila, Racial and Ethnic Bias in Decisions to Shoot
Seen Through a Stronger Lens: Experimental Results from High-Fidelity Laboratory Simulations,
10 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 323, 334 (2014); Lois James, Stephen M. James & Bryan
Vila, The Reverse Racism Effect: Are Cops More Hesitant to Shoot Black than White Suspects?, 15
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 457, 458 (2016).
101 See, e.g., Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 171 (2008).
102 See Richardson & Goff, supra note 21, at 305; Saul L. Miller, Kate Zielaskowski & E.
Ashby Plant, The Basis of Shooter Bias: Beyond Cultural Stereotypes, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1358 (2012).
103 See L. Song Richardson & Devon W. Carbado, The Black Police: Policing Our Own, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1979, 1992 n.33–37 (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR
OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)) (collecting sources documenting
anti-Black unconscious biases among Black people).
104 Analyses of self-defense killings that focus on the race of the killer miss this point. For
example, some raised questions about whether racism could possibly be relevant to the Martin
killing because George Zimmerman is Hispanic. See Race Plays Confusing Role in Trayvon
Martin Case, CBS NEWS (July 10, 2013, 4:46 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/race-playsconfusing-role-in-trayvon-martin-case [https://perma.cc/RWJ9-D4KN] (“[P]ossible racial
motives on Zimmerman’s part became tough to pin down. His background and associations cut
across racial lines, and his racial identity didn’t fit neatly into a box.”) Similarly, some
commentators have framed the issue in police killing cases as one about the privilege of White
officers, pointing to the indictment of Jeronimo Yanez and the conviction of Peter Liang as
evidence that non-White officers do not benefit in the same way. See, e.g., Filiberto Nolasco
Gomez, The Rare Indictment and Trial of Jeronimo Yanez ‘Proves White Privilege Exists and
Protects White Cops’, DAILY PLANET (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.tcdailyplanet.net/the-rareindictment-of-jeronimo-yanez-proves-white-privilege-exists-and-protects-white-cops
[http://perma.cc/3428-A94Q]; see also Eric Dang, Why the Asian Community Is Upset about the
Peter Liang Verdict, ODYSSEY (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.theodysseyonline.com/controversybehind-peter-liang [http://perma.cc/WX6F-7FAW] (“[I]t is very clear that between Peter Liang
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means that a person’s ability to assess the threat of a target is affected by
the race of the target. Legal scholars L. Song Richardson and Cynthia
Lee have carefully examined the connection between implicit racial bias
and self-defense. Richardson, writing with psychologist Phillip Atiba
Goff, explains, “Blacks serve as our mental prototype (i.e., stereotype)
for the violent street criminal” and “[w]hen the person being judged fits
a criminal stereotype, the suspicion heuristic can cause the actor more
easily to believe honestly—but mistakenly—that the person poses a
threat and that deadly force is necessary.” 105 According to Lee,
If most individuals would be more likely to “see” a weapon in the
hands of an unarmed Black person than in the hands of an unarmed
White person and are thus more likely to shoot an unarmed Black
person when they would not shoot a similarly situated White person,
then jurors in self-defense cases may also be more likely to find that
an individual who says he shot an unarmed Black person in selfdefense because he believed the victim was about to kill or seriously
injure him acted reasonably, even if he was mistaken. 106

It would be reasonable to expect, then, that self-defense doctrine is more
likely to exonerate people who kill Black victims. 107 The limited data
and Daniel Holtzclaw . . . certain officers are not offered the same police union support as
others.”). While it may be true that non-White police officers, and perhaps non-White civilians,
who kill Black people are more likely to be punished, these cases demonstrate anti-Black bias
and the role of Blackness in the larger structure of White supremacy is not simply the province
of individual White people.
105 Richardson & Goff, supra note 21, at 310, 314. Richardson and Goff propose that killings
in which unconscious racial bias played a role be treated as presumptively unreasonable. Id. at
321–26.
106 Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 21, at 1584–85. Lee suggests that explicitly
discussing racial bias during self-defense trials may help disentangle biased fear from
reasonable fear. Id. at 1590–1601; see also Richardson & Goff, The Suspicion Heuristic, supra
note 21, at 326 (adopting Lee’s proposal that judges use “race-switching” jury instructions).
107 We might also expect it to be more difficult to recognize Black claims of self-defense
against non-Black victims, a possibility that is also supported by available data. KROUSE &
DEATON, supra note 46, at 3 & tbl.1. This dynamic is complicated by the reality that there is a
winner and a loser in any homicide involving a claim of self-defense. Where the non-Black
person is the one killed, the Black person may not be able to claim he was acting in self-defense
if the conduct of the other person is understood to arise from his initial fear of the Black
person. The Black person would then become the initial aggressor, the victim’s behavior would
be legally justifiable, and the killer would have no self-defense claim. Where the Black person is
the one killed, any preceding self-defense claim of the victim is erased. See infra notes 268–74
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available suggest that that this is so. 108 Finally, researchers have shown
that implicit racial bias can infect various stages of the criminal justice
system, including public defender triage, 109 prosecutorial discretion in
charging, 110 jury determinations, 111 and sentencing. 112 Just as the shooter
bias studies have raised concerns about how widely held biases might
lead to more Black deaths, these studies should raise concerns about
whether the substantive laws and procedural mechanisms of the
criminal justice system may worsen, rather than remedy, pervasive
bias. 113
3.

Cultural Anti-Blackness

Research demonstrating that subjective threat assessment is
affected by unconscious racial bias has received well-deserved attention
from criminal law scholars, but explicit bias matters too. For many
Americans, Blackness is a proxy for dangerousness in their conscious
minds as well. Selective news coverage of local crime reinforces this
cultural myth. 114 It is hardly surprising, then, that our culture tends to
and accompanying text for further discussion of a case showing how this might play out in
neighborhoods.
108 See supra notes 37–53 (discussing federal homicide statistics).
109 See, e.g., L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013).
110 See generally Smith & Levinson, supra note 83.
111 See generally Casey Reynolds, Implicit Bias and the Problem of Certainty in the Criminal
Standard of Proof, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 229 (2013).
112 See generally Kimberly Papillon, The Court’s Brain: Neuroscience and Judicial Decision
Making in Criminal Sentencing, 49 CT. REV. 48 (2013).
113 See CHERYL STAATS, STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2014 23–25 (2014)
(summarizing sources cited supra notes 109–12 and other recent work on implicit bias in the
criminal justice system).
114 See, e.g., Eileen E.S. Bjornstrom, Robert L. Kaufman, Ruth D. Peterson & Michael Slater,
Race and Ethnic Representations of Lawbreakers and Victims in Crime News: A National Study
of Television Coverage, 57 SOC. PROBS. 269, 272 (2010); Richard J. Lundman, The
Newsworthiness and Selection Bias in News About Murder: Comparative and Relative Effects of
Novelty and Race and Gender Typifications on Newspaper Coverage of Homicide, 18 SOC. F. 357,
358–59 (2003). Accord NAZGOL GANDNOOSH, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS
OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES 13–14, 18–19, 22–23 (2014) (summarizing
research showing that people over-estimate Black and Hispanic crime rates and linking this
over-estimation to disparate media representation and support for punitive policies). See also
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“view crime as a predominantly Black phenomenon.” 115 Khalil Gibran
Muhammad has documented how the relationship between Blackness
and criminality, and the certainty of the Black criminal, evolved out of a
combination of history, racist policies, sociological studies of immigrant
crimes, and the advent of federal crime statistics. 116
Olivia Bertalan, one of George Zimmerman’s neighbors, articulated
the explicit fear of Black intruders shared by many of her White
neighbors when she described her experience weeks earlier when two
men broke into her home. She told the jury how she hid in a bedroom
with her infant son while two Black men went through her home and
stole electronics. 117 The only connection between the burglary and
Trayvon Martin’s death was that they occurred in the same
neighborhood, Zimmerman was aware of the previous break-in, and
Martin was also Black. Bertalan’s story, though, echoed a commonly
held fear of Black intruders as threats to White women and children.118
In her story, she looks out of the peephole of her door to see “two young
African American guys” ringing her doorbell, at which point she panics,
calls her mother, calls the police, and hides out in her son’s room. 119
Although her story ends with a break-in, she seems to have assumed this
ending the moment she saw the men on her porch. 120 The narrative of
Calvin John Smiley, From “Brute” to “Thug:” The Demonization and Criminalization of
Unarmed Black Male Victims in America, 26 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 350, 353–55 (2016)
(finding that unarmed Black male victims are also disproportionately portrayed as criminal).
115 See Thelma L. Harmon, Codification of Fear: SYG Laws, 5 RALPH BUNCHE J. PUB. AFF. 1,
6 (2016).
116 See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE,
CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010).
117 See Bloom, supra note 57.
118 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 18 (manuscript at 26–29).
119 Bloom, supra note 57.
120 This same narrative was invoked by Theodore Wafer, who shot and killed Renisha
McBride through his screen door when he saw her standing on his porch. Wafer, who claimed
self-defense but was denied a self-defense jury instruction, was convicted and sentenced to
prison, but the judge who handed down his sentence expressed sympathy for his story. See
Alana Semuels, Detroit-Area Man Gets 17 to 32 Years for Shooting Visitor on Porch, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-porch-killer-sentenced20140903-story.html [http://perma.cc/HZQ7-SMSE] (quoting Judge Dana Hathaway as saying
to Wafer, “I do not believe that you are a coldblooded murderer or that this case had anything
to do with race . . . . I do believe that you acted out of fear . . . .”); see also Jenna Amatulli, Black
Teen Nearly Shot after Knocking on Door Asking for Directions to School, HUFFPOST (Apr. 13,
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the Black intruder, particularly when juxtaposed against a White female
victim, holds power regardless of its truth or the ultimate outcome. 121
Fear of Black crime as a cultural phenomenon matters because,
while it is not necessarily correlated with actual risk of crime, 122 fear of
crime can drive individual responses as well as collective responses in
the form of enactment of new criminal laws. 123 While psychological
research on unconscious bias has been the subject of sustained attention
in criminal law, the racial bias that shapes fear of crime on an individual
and societal level is often expressly stated.
2018, 1:56 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/black-teen-nearly-shot-asking-fordirections_us_5ad0d38be4b077c89ce82acc [https://perma.cc/FTG5-GKD4] (recounting how
Brennan Walker knocked on a door to ask for directions after missing his school bus and was
greeted by a gun and a woman shouting, “Why are you trying to break into my house?”). This
narrative of presumptive Black criminality may also be at play when people share footage from
security cameras or smart doorbells with police or on social media. See infra notes 278, 299 and
accompanying text (describing this phenomenon). Those instances sometimes involve footage
of Black people in yards, on porches, at front doors, or even ringing doorbells that someone has
deemed “suspicious.” See, e.g., David Debolt, Black Firefighter Doing His Job Questioned by
Suspicious Neighbors, EAST BAY TIMES (June 25, 2018, 9:57 AM), https://
www.eastbaytimes.com/2018/06/25/report-resident-called-police-on-black-oakland-firefighterduring-routine-inspection [https://perma.cc/6VJX-4YLH] (describing an incident in which a
woman “contacted the neighborhood’s community resource officer after finding [a]
firefighter . . . on her property,” included surveillance video footage, and said she “was
concerned the person may be posing” as a firefighter); Pendarvis Harshaw, Nextdoor, the Social
Network for Neighbors, is Becoming a Home for Racial Profiling, SPLINTER (Mar. 24, 2015, 10:02
AM),
https://splinternews.com/nextdoor-the-social-network-for-neighbors-is-becoming1793846596 [https://perma.cc/Y3AS-RWSN] (describing an incident in which an Oakland
woman posted a warning and description of two Black men, who turned out to be friends of a
neighbor, ringing her doorbell).
121 See generally Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitor: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1995) (critiquing the way
defense attorneys in self-defense trials exploit cultural fears of Blackness to make the
defendant’s fear seem reasonable).
122 See Lynn Newhart Smith & Gary Hill, Perceptions of Crime Seriousness and Fear of
Crime, 24 SOC. FOCUS 315 (1991).
123 See, e.g., Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on
Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 12–13 (2013) (describing the role of fear and its
exploitation by lawmakers in the tough on crime policies of the 1980s and 1990s); Kate Hynes,
The Cost of Fear: An Analysis of Sex Offender Registration, Community Notification, and Civil
Commitment Laws in the United States and the United Kingdom, 2 PENN. STATE J.L. & INT’L
AFF., 351, 377–78 (2013) (critiquing sex offenders laws in two and asserting that the restrictive
regimes are the result of fear, particularly in the wake of high-profile crimes).
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Reasonableness and Colorblindness

In cases involving strangers, the killer’s assessment of threat must
be made quickly and based on easy-to-ascertain cues, including race and
gender. This is important in light of the psychological evidence
described in Section I.B.1, which demonstrated a widespread
unconscious tendency to associate Blackness with criminality, and to
fear Black people. These implicit biases, coupled with the cultural myths
described in Section I.B.3, mean that racial bias is embedded in all
stranger self-defense cases because the question of who we fear and how
much we fear them nearly always implicates race.
Two additional dynamics operate to further exacerbate the
problem of racial bias in the law of self-defense. First, the requirement
of objective reasonableness, 124 which is supposed to operate as a check
on individual biases, may instead operate to rubber stamp individual
bias if the decision-maker shares the same psychological and cultural
fears. Second, courts’ tendencies to adopt a colorblind approach to
adjudicating cases that do not involve direct and explicit race
discrimination prevent the judicial process from acknowledging the role
that bias may play.
Reasonableness is an objective standard, but an objective standard
tolerates bias as long as the bias is shared by the people who apply it. A
prosecutor or jury’s after-the-fact assessment of whether the fear was
reasonable is, at its core, a question of whether the members of the jury
would have assessed the threat similarly. It is a question of shared fear.
Because the biases are widespread among perpetrators, judges, and
potential jurors, the reasonableness requirement that should provide a
check against racist vigilantism may offer only illusory protection
against racial violence under color of self-defense law. 125 Bias may
influence both a defendant’s perception of danger and a police officer,

124 See supra notes 74–78 (doctrine requires that fear be reasonable, but not necessarily
correct).
125 See, e.g., Richardson & Goff, supra note 21, at 318–19; Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin,
supra note 21, at 103.

Rolnick.40.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

1674

5/17/2019 10:04 AM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1639

prosecutor, judge, or jury’s conclusion as to whether that fear was
reasonable. 126
Furthermore, the reasonableness test may only accommodate some
versions of shared fear. The hypothetical reasonable person is likely to
be a reasonable White man. 127 When measured against this standard,
the fears of women and non-White people may not register, obscuring
those people’s potential self-defense claims and opening the door for
others to claim self-defense when responding violently to them.
Despite the core significance of race and the possibility for racial
bias in stranger self-defense cases, the legal principle of colorblindness
dominates: 128 as long as the law at issue is facially race-neutral and no
express declaration of racial bias is present in the facts, race is not
addressed. 129 Despite the deep association between race and fear, selfdefense doctrine—like most of criminal law—does not force courts to
engage the possibility of racial bias. Absent evidence of explicit,
intentional racist behavior on the part of the killer, express nonengagement with racial issues is more common. For example, the judge
in the Zimmerman trial famously barred the prosecutor from using the
term “racial profiling” to describe Zimmerman’s activities on the night

126 Richardson & Goff, supra note 21 (arguing that self-defense law should be altered to
account for predictable racial biases and, specifically, that in light of these biases, the duty to
retreat should be a requirement of all self-defense laws); see also Lee, Making Race Salient,
supra note 21, at 1584–85 (describing the role of racial stereotypes about Blacks, Latinxs, and
Asian Americans in the assessment of reasonable fear in self-defense cases).
127 See Andrea Headley & Mohamad G. Alkadry, The Fight or Flight Response: A Look at
Stand Your Ground, 5 RALPH BUNCHE J. PUB. AFFAIRS 1 (2016) (describing the evolution of the
American “true man” rule as race and gender-specific); LEE, supra note 20, at 204, 212–17. The
case law on self-defense, particularly the no-retreat rule, is replete with gender-specific
references. See, e.g., Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199 (1876) (“[A] true man, who is without
fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant.”).
128 See Haney-López, supra note 88, at 1876 (“We live today under a Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence geared toward excluding evidence of the evolving mistreatment of
non-Whites. Colorblindness disregards the reparative motives that animate affirmative action
and renders immaterial the larger context of continuing discrimination in a society otherwise
struggling to get past racism. Meanwhile, when evaluating disproportionate harm to nonWhites, malicious intent dismisses historical and sociological evidence of racial stratification—
ostensibly because it cannot prove the animus of named culprits.”).
129 Accord Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 245, 247–52
(2010) (describing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as “a series of race cases in which race is
rarely mentioned”).
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of the shooting. 130 This refusal to discuss or address race in criminal
cases may even worsen bias. 131
To summarize, even in its most basic form, self-defense doctrine is
vulnerable to racial bias and, coupled with courts’ presumption of
colorblindness, poorly suited to guard against it. Self-defense laws also
provide ready cover to those acting with conscious racial animus. 132 A
vigilante acting on overt racism may successfully claim self-defense as
long as his victim is someone a reasonable jury would fear. Self-defense
law enshrines shared fear into law, and often does so without
mentioning race at all or acknowledging its impact.
C.

Expanding the Self-Defense Exception

Given the potential for bias to infect split-second decisions about
the use of deadly force and the high cost of mistaken self-defense claims,
it would be reasonable to expect that self-defense would be tightly
circumscribed by legal rules that limit the situations in which it can be
invoked to only the most unavoidable scenarios and that subject most
claims of justifiable homicide to legal scrutiny. Yet, the opposite is true.
Most states have adopted a constellation of additional rules that relax
the basic requirements. These rules make self-defense easier to claim,
including removing many cases from legal review, and they make it

See Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 21, at 102–03; see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A
CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE LAW: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 206–09
(1988) (describing how the court in People v. Goetz did not mention the fact that Goetz was
White and his victims were Black teenagers, setting the stage for the defense attorneys to use
race covertly, including a staged reenactment using Black Guardian Angels as stand-ins for the
teenaged victims, without any express reckoning).
131 Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin, supra note 21, at 94, 107, 113 (noting “ignoring racial
difference can actually exacerbate the effects of implicit racial bias” and highlighting research
suggesting that “ignoring race leads jurors to assess black defendants more harshly”).
132 For example, Michael Dunn, whose self-defense claim was rejected after he shot Jordan
Davis, a Black teenager, in a confrontation over Davis’s music, wrote letters to his daughter
from jail in which he admitted to mounting prejudice against Black “thugs” and expressed his
belief that “if more people would arm themselves and kill these (expletive) idiots when they’re
threatening you, eventually they may take the hint and change their behavior.” Jamelle Bouie, A
Killer’s Racist Rants, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 6, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/akillers-racist-rants [http://perma.cc/9Q4N-FGPK]. Dunn’s letters reveal a racism that is neither
unconscious nor hidden but is instead an idea he believes deserves greater support. Id.
130
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facially available in more situations. Some of these rules have deep roots
in common law and are intended to address gaps left by strict
application of the core principles. Others, however, are relatively new.
Most strikingly, many of the newer laws do not appear to address a clear
gap in existing law: their primary effects are symbolic (they reinforce the
desirability of self-defense) and procedural (they insulate a person who
kills in self-defense from review by a jury).
Today, expansions to self-defense law are often presented as part of
a package of reforms designed to make the defense easier to claim.
Florida’s 2005 law, which included a no-retreat rule, presumption of
threat rules, and procedural changes, is a prime example. 133 In other
states, advocacy groups have proposed reform packages modeled after
Florida’s law, 134 often hand in hand with proposals to loosen restrictions
on private gun ownership and use. 135 The conservative American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) made these reforms a priority,
crafting and circulating model legislation that was eventually introduced
in Florida and across the country. 136 While state legislatures can and do
133 See Headley & Alkadry, supra note 127; Lave, supra note 3, at 833–34; Weaver, supra
note 3, at 399–401; John F. Timoney, Florida’s Disastrous Self-Defense Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/opinion/floridas-disastrous-self-defenselaw.html [https://perma.cc/EKM5-32PE]. The National Rifle Association was instrumental in
ensuring passage of Florida’s law. See Lave, supra note 3, at 836–38; Weaver, supra note 3, at
396. Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound–A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon
Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law,
23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 286–88 (2012) (describing the Florida law’s immunity
provision); Jennifer Randolph, How to Get Away with Murder: Criminal and Civil Immunity
Provisions in “Stand Your Ground” Legislation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 608–16 (2014)
(analyzing civil and criminal immunity laws adopted by Florida, Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky,
and Oklahoma, and noting that Florida’s 2005 law also established a presumption of
reasonableness when force was used against an intruder in an occupied home or vehicle).
134 See Lave, supra note 3, at 839; Weaver, supra note 3, at 397; Heath Druzin, Gun Rights
Groups Pressure Legislators to Expand Stand Your Ground Rules, IDEASTREAM (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://wclv.ideastream.org/news/gun-rights-groups-pressure-legislators-to-expand-standyour-ground-rules [https://perma.cc/N4PC-2BHY].
135 Press Release, Ctr for Media & Democracy, ALEC’s Legislative Agenda on Guns, https://
www.alecexposed.org/w/images/b/b8/Header_ALEC_on_Guns_Final_PDF.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/7XQ9-MALZ].
136 See John Nichols, How ALEC Took Florida’s ‘License to Kill’ Law National, NATION (Mar.
22, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-alec-took-floridas-license-kill-law-national
[https://perma.cc/VWR6-URPN]. The group has since eliminated public safety as a key issue
area. Tom Hamburger, Legislative Committee Moves Away from ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws,
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pick and choose among the proposed reforms, 137 it is significant that
they are typically advanced as a package. This suggests that the goal is
not so much to address any flaw in a state’s current approach, but to
broaden the right of self-defense generally.
Most commentators have focused on laws that eliminate the
common law duty to retreat, 138 but that focus is too narrow. The
widespread attention to no-retreat laws has engendered confusion and
counterarguments focused on whether Zimmerman actually benefitted
from the no-retreat provision of Florida’s law, 139 whether he benefitted
from the 2005 law at all, 140 and whether eliminating the duty to retreat is
actually a recent or rare innovation in the law of self-defense. 141
WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/legislative-committeemoves-away-from-stand-your-ground-laws/2012/04/17/gIQAN1ytOT_story.html? utm_term=.
839a31f6927c [https://perma.cc/Y7NU-N9J7].
137 For example, the Nevada legislature in 2011 codified its no-retreat rule but rejected
several other expansions, including a presumption of reasonable fear and a provision extending
defense of habitation rules to vehicles and workplaces, that were originally proposed as part of a
single bill. See A.B. 381, 76th Leg. (Nev. 2011) (including all proposed amendments); A.B. 321,
76th Leg. (Nev. 2011) (including only no-retreat provisions); Andy Chow, Ohio Legislature
Passes Self-Defense Gun Bill Over Kasich’s Objections, WOSU (Dec. 27, 2018), http://
radio.wosu.org/post/ohio-legislature-passes-self-defense-gun-bill-over-kasichs-objections#
stream/0 [https://perma.cc/B8P6-H2D2] (describing how Ohio lawmakers stripped the noretreat provision, but passed a bill shifting the burden of proof in self-defense cases and
restricting local gun control laws).
138 See, e.g., Lave, supra note 3, at 832–34; Anthony Hall, A Stand for Justice—Examining
Why Stand Your Ground Laws Negatively Impact African Americans, 7 S. REGION BLACK L.
STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 95, 97–98 (2013); Barnes, supra note 31, at 3180.
139 See, e.g., Dan Abrams, No, Florida’s Stand Your Ground Did Not Determine Either
Zimmerman or Dunn Cases, ABC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/floridasstand-ground-law-determine-zimmerman-dunn-cases/story?id=22543929
[http://perma.cc/3T4F-5SFQ]; Jacob Sullum, Sorry, the Zimmerman Case Still Has Nothing to
Do with ‘Stand Your Ground’, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (July 14, 2013, 11:12 AM), http://
reason.com/blog/2013/07/14/sorry-the-zimmerman-case-still-has-nothi
[http://perma.cc/
GGN7-EW2Y].
140 See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Coates, How Stand Your Ground Relates to George Zimmerman,
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/how-standyour-ground-relates-to-george-zimmerman/277829
[http://perma.cc/8CFE-DZV5]
(responding to Jacob Sullum by pointing out that the immunity provision of Florida’s law likely
made a difference in how the prosecution proceeded, but still referring to the law as “stand your
ground”); Nicole Flatow, Zimmerman Juror Says Panel Considered Stand Your Ground In
Deliberations: ‘He Had a Right to Defend Himself’, THINK PROGRESS (July 16, 2013, 2:46 AM),
https://thinkprogress.org/zimmerman-juror-says-panel-considered-stand-your-ground-indeliberations-he-had-a-right-to-defend-10e55e0750bf
[http://perma.cc/7QT7-Q6GD]
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In fact, Florida and many other states have enacted or considered a
range of statutory amendments in the past two decades that broaden the
scope of self-defense. Eliminating the duty to retreat is neither the only
nor necessarily the most sweeping change wrought by these laws. They
all make self-defense easier to claim, but they do so in different ways,
including codifying presumptions, eliminating requirements, and
shifting procedural burdens. Use of the term “stand your ground” as
shorthand for laws that expand the right of self-defense is confusing
because it lumps together several distinct legal rules under an umbrella
term that refers to one specific rule. The focus on reforms adopted in
the past decade also obscure the role of other doctrines that expand the
right of self-defense but have deeper roots in the common law, such as
defense of habitation and the castle doctrine.
In this Section, I describe various types of state laws that expand on
the core principles of self-defense by relaxing one of the traditional
substantive requirements—imminence, proportionality, necessity, or
reasonableness—or by removing more claims from the courts.
Conceptualizing this constellation of laws in terms of how they relax the
core requirements helps illustrate just how broad the self-defense
exception can be. My goal here is to demonstrate that all the various
rules, new and old, related to defensive use of force are really
expressions of, or shortcuts around, one of these basic requirements.
Viewed this way, modern self-defense law appears to be a collection of
ways that states have chosen to permit the use of deadly force in more
scenarios and make it easier for defendants to claim it.

(interview with juror who vaguely invoked “stand your ground” as one reason the jury reached
its verdict).
141 Andrew F. Branca, ‘Stand Your Ground’ Continues to Gain Ground, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 18,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/stand-your-ground-iowa-35-statesflorida-trayvon-martin-black-lives-matter [http://perma.cc/39VB-QRTY] (“Stand-your-ground
is not a legal aberration. At the time of the Zimmerman trial, only 18 states did not adhere to
the ‘stand your ground’ doctrine. The other 32 imposed no legal duty on victims of unlawful
attacks to retreat before they could use deadly force in self-defense.”); see also Pamela Cole Bell,
Stand Your Ground Laws: Mischaracterized, Misconstrued, and Misunderstood, 46 U. MEMPHIS
L. REV. 383, 389 n.29 (2015) (citing statutes to show that a majority of states had a no-retreat
rule before Florida enacted its law).
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Imminence

In the most basic form of self-defense, a defendant must
demonstrate that the threatened harm to which he is reacting is
imminent. 142 The laws described in this Section relax or shortcut this
requirement by permitting a person to presume that an assailant is
about to use deadly force in situations where no fight has started and no
weapon is visible.
The imminence requirement has received a great deal of scholarly
attention for the barriers it poses to people who use deadly force to fight
back against abusive partners. 143 In such cases, an abusive partner may
pose a deadly threat over the long term or in the future, but if a person
kills her abusive partner in a moment of calm, such as when the attacker
is asleep, she may be denied a self-defense instruction because the threat
was not imminent at that moment. 144 A minority of jurisdictions have
instead adopted a slightly looser temporal requirement of immediate
threat. 145 Attorneys may also rely on evidence about the cycle of abusive
relationships in individual cases to explain to a jury why the threat may
appear imminent to a person in the defendant’s position. 146 Yet, the
problems posed by imminence in domestic violence cases have not

142 ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 99; Maguigan, supra note 22, at 414 (describing how
imminence requirement limits the availability of self-defense in cases where women kill their
abusive partners); AYA GRUBER, THE DUTY TO RETREAT IN SELF-DEFENSE LAW AND VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 4, 7–10 (2017), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935352-e-5?print=pdf
(describing
traditional
imminence requirement and distinguishing between that and the minority approach of
requiring only and “immediate” threat in the context of abuser killings).
143 LEVERICK, supra note 62, at 92–93.
144 Id. at 92 n.29 (citing cases).
145 Id. at 97 (describing the MPC’s “immediately necessary” formulation and citing state
laws); GRUBER, supra note 142, at 4.
146 See Robert F. Schopp, Barbara J. Sturgis & Megan Sullivan, Battered Woman Syndrome,
Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45,
55–63; Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 37 (1991). But see GRUBER, supra note 142, at 7 (explaining that such
testimony may help surmount the necessity requirement, but does not necessarily explain why
an abused partner would believe a sleeping person posed an imminent threat, leading many
scholars to pursue changes in self-defense doctrine).
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resulted in a widespread effort by state legislatures to modify the
imminence requirement by statute. 147
On the other hand, statutory and common law incorporates some
rules that do modify the imminence requirement by allowing a
defendant to presume the existence of an imminent threat even where
the evidence may not support it. A primary example of this is a defense
of habitation law. In every state, it is legal to kill a person who is
breaking into your home, even if there is no evidence of an imminent
deadly threat. 148 This rule, called “defense of habitation” or “defense of
dwelling,” was part of the English common law and incorporated in
American jurisdictions. 149 State statutes differ in their precise
requirements, but many laws allow a person to presume the existence of
an imminent deadly threat when a person breaks into, or is about to
break into, an occupied dwelling. 150
One rationale offered for home defense laws is the prediction that
home invasions might lead to inter-personal violence because most
intruders are present for criminal purposes and might therefore react
with violence if confronted by the residents. 151 According to this view, it
is impractical to require a person to wait for evidence that the intruder
intends to do harm to someone in the home before force may be used.

147 See Hava Dayan & Emanuel Gross, Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Battered Women
Claiming Self-Defense and a Legislative Proposal to Amend Section 3.04(2)(B) of the U.S. Model
Penal Code, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 17, 33 n.81, 33–39 (2015) (discussing a proposal to amend
the MPC to better deal with its imminence problem). But see Fletcher, supra note 66, at 218–19
(arguing in favor of retaining a strict, objective imminence requirement and stating that “the
underlying relationship of dominance and subordination should not bear on the analysis of
self-defense”); Joshua Dressler, Reply: Battered Women, Sleeping Abusers, and Political Moral
Theory, in FLETCHER’S ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL LAW 225, 227 (Russell L. Christopher ed., 2013)
(“To claim that a reasonable person might think that a sleeping man represents an imminent
threat is virtually to defend the oxymoron of a ‘reasonable irrational person.’”).
148 Annotation, Homicide or Assault in Defense of Habitation or Property, 25 A.L.R. 508
(1923).
149 SANGERO, supra note 65, at 266–67; LEVERICK, supra note 62, at 137–39.
150 Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in
Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9–18 (describing and classifying types
of defense of habitation laws). Some of these statutes include language specifically permitting a
person to presume the existence of a deadly threat when an intruder enters or is about to enter
the home, a framing that highlights the way these laws shortcut the imminence requirement. Id.
at 28.
151 SANGERO, supra note 65, at 267.
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Defense of home laws can thus be understood to modify the imminence
requirement by establishing a presumption of imminent harm if a
person breaks into an occupied dwelling. At common law, deadly force
could be used only against an intruder who intended to commit a
violent felony, 152 an approach that supports the idea that defense of
habitation laws offer a shortcut around the imminence requirement for
people who encounter intruders at home. 153 Statutes differ according to
how close the intruder must be to entering the premises, 154 a difference
that can have significant consequences in the context described in Part
II.
Other provisions extend the idea of home defense to more places,
creating a presumption of imminent threat when an intruder tries to
break into an unoccupied building, a car, or a boat. A 2015 Nevada law,
for example, allows a person to presume that a deadly threat exists in
any case involving suspected home invasion or grand larceny of a
vehicle. 155
2.

Proportionality

If defensive force must be proportional to the threatened harm,
then deadly force would never be permitted in response to anything
short of a deadly threat and killing someone in defense of property
would never be justifiable. Yet, self-defense laws in most states relax this
proportionality requirement slightly, in that they permit the use of
deadly force in response to a threat of death or certain other violent
crimes, most commonly robbery, rape, and kidnapping. 156
152 Sarah A. Pohlman, Shooting from the Hip: Missouri’s New Approach to Defense of
Habitation, 56 ST. LOUIS L.J. 857, 859 (2012).
153 See id. at 864 (describing defense of habitation under Missouri common law as differing
from self-defense in that it allowed defensive force to be undertaken earlier). Because it is only
available against an unlawful intruder, see, e.g., State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d. 780, 787 (Minn.
2017), the defense of habitation presumption cannot be used by defendants who kill a spouse or
other cohabitant, leaving the imminence problem described above unresolved.
154 See Green, supra note 150, at 17–18.
155 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.095 (West 2019).
156 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 (West 2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(b) (McKinney
2019). Cf. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.200 (West 2019) (permitting deadly force “in order to save the
person’s own life, or to prevent the person from receiving great bodily harm”). See also
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The New York statute at issue when Bernhard Goetz shot Darrell
Cabey, Barry Allen, Troy Canty, and James Ramseur on a subway car
was one such law. 157 Goetz did not claim that he feared his victims were
about to kill him. 158 He did not need to do so because New York’s law
permitted the use of deadly force when a person “reasonably believes
that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a
kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery.” 159
Because he felt surrounded by his victims and because they asked him
for money, Goetz convinced a jury that he reasonably feared either a
robbery or deadly physical force. 160 This slight modification of the
proportionality rule meant that Goetz was not required to present
evidence suggesting that any of the five teenagers appeared to be
holding a deadly weapon. 161 Robbery is a taking involving violence or
threat, 162 but it need not involve a deadly threat. Yet, under New York’s
statute, Goetz could shoot or kill to defend himself against any
threatened force at all if it occurred in the context of a robbery.
Notwithstanding the discussion of imminence above, defense of
habitation is most commonly conceptualized as an exception to the
proportionality requirement. 163 The home, it is argued, is a special place,
the value of which lies somewhere between property and human life. 164
If this is the underlying rationale, home defense laws modify the
proportionality requirement by providing that deadly force is legal in

SANGERO, supra note 65, at 168 (“A striking example of this flexibility of the proportionality
requirement is the accepted assumption that the exercise of lethal force is justified even when
the danger to the attacked person is not one of death, but rather one of severe bodily harm.”).
157 FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 130, at 25 (noting that New York law
permitted deadly force in response to a threat of deadly physical force or an attempted robbery
and characterizing the attempted robbery provision as “a peculiarity of New York law”).
158 Id. at 11, 118–20 (describing how Goetz, in a taped confession, talked about fear of a
potential robbery or of being beaten up, but noting that he also denied seeing their words and
gestures as a threat and denied being afraid of a robbery).
159 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(b); see People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 106 (1986).
160 FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 130, at 197.
161 In fact, he testified that he was certain none of them had a gun. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d at 101.
Some were carrying screwdrivers, but there is no evidence that Goetz knew about them.
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 130, at 26.
162 FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 130, at 25.
163 See Green, supra note 150, at 32–37.
164 LEVERICK, supra note 62, at 142; SANGERO, supra note 65, at 266–67.
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response to the threat of a home invasion (though that threat must still
be imminent and the use of force necessary). 165 This rationale seems
particularly applicable to many modern defense of habitation statutes,
which apply to any trespasser, not just one who plans to commit a
violent or forcible felony. 166 The stated rationale of some state
legislatures for expanding these laws is to make it easier for people to
defend their homes against the assumed risk of burglaries. 167 If this
rationale is extended to other forms of property, such as cars or boats,
such laws can also be viewed as modifying the proportionality rule by
permitting deadly force in response to threats to special categories of
property. 168
A more controversial expansion of self-defense involves statutes
that allow a private citizen to shoot to stop a fleeing felon. 169 Texas law,
for example, permits a private citizen to use lethal force against “the
other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery,
aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime.” 170 The same statute
alters the traditional proportionality requirement in another significant

165 LEVERICK, supra note 62, at 138; Green, supra note 150, at 32. The right to defend one’s
home may also be protected by state constitutions. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional
Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of Property, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 409–10 (2007).
166 See Green, supra note 150, at 11–16.
167 See, e.g., Derek E. Empire, Crimes and Offenses: Defense to Criminal Prosecution: Change
Provisions Relating to the Use of Force in the Defense of Habitations or Residences; Provide for
Related Matters, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 25–27 (2001) (describing the history of Georgia’s
expanded home defense law).
168 Green, supra note 150, at 3–4, 12–13.
169 Police, of course, may use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon provided the force is
reasonable under the circumstances. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (officer’s
decision to shoot a Black teenager fleeing an unoccupied house that was the site of a likely
burglary was reasonable in light of circumstances, including the officer’s belief that Garner
posed a threat).
170 TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.42(2)(B) (West 2019). But see F. Patrick Hubbard, The Value of
Life: Constitutional Limits on Citizens’ Use of Deadly Force, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 623, 637
(2014) (arguing that the need to stop a fleeing felon, without more, is not sufficient to satisfy
the standard for use of deadly force); see also Nicholas A. Serrano, Vigilante Justice at the Home
Depot: The Civilian Use of Deadly Force under Michigan’s Common Law Fleeing-Felon Rule, 11
CHARLESTON L. REV. 159 (2017) (discussion of more recent applications of fleeing felon laws in
other states).
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way by allowing private citizens to use deadly force in defense of
property. 171
3.

Necessity

Because the use of deadly force in self-defense must be necessary,
the core doctrine requires that the person who is attacked must use
alternative measures to avoid the threatened harm if they are available.
The most important manifestation of the necessity principle is the
general rule that deadly force cannot be used if safe retreat is available. 172
Besides retreat, the necessity principle also requires that a defendant opt
to de-escalate a conflict if possible, or to use less-than-lethal force if that
is all that is necessary to stop the threat. 173 Most jurisdictions do not
allow an initial aggressor to use deadly force in response to a
confrontation he initiated; 174 in other words, if a deadly confrontation
could have been avoided by not starting the fight, then defensive force is
not strictly necessary and is therefore illegal.
The “castle doctrine” provides that a person who is attacked in his
or her own home need not retreat to safety, even if retreat is an option,
before using deadly force. 175 This rule partially eliminates the necessity
requirement by permitting a person involved in a conflict to choose
deadly force even when deadly force is not strictly necessary because
retreat is possible. Castle doctrine rules have long been in place in most
states, but they have traditionally been limited to situations where a
person is attacked in the home. 176 Together with defense of habitation

171 TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.42(2). See generally George Wilfred Stumberg, Defense of Person
and Property under Texas Criminal Law, 21 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1942) (summarizing Texas
common law).
172 At English common law, retreat was also required, if safe retreat was available, before
defensive force could be used. Leverick, supra note 62, at 70–74; SANGERO, supra note 65, at
198–99.The American rule eliminated the retreat requirement for defensive use of non-deadly
force, but many American jurisdictions still required retreat before deadly force would be
authorized anywhere outside the home. Id. at 200–01.
173 ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 99.
174 LEE, supra note 20, at 131; SANGERO, supra note 65, at 314.
175 See GRUBER, supra note 142, at 4–5.
176 See NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE, SHOOT FIRST: STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS AND THEIR
EFFECT ON VIOLENT CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2013), https://everytown
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laws, castle doctrine laws relax the typical requirements for self-defense
in home invasion cases, signifying the deeply rooted idea that people
have special rights to protect their homes. 177 As Jeanne Suk explains,
Within the home and nowhere else, the common law recognized the
right of the home resident—archetypally a man defending his
family—to use deadly force to repel the intruder, without obligation
to retreat. An intruder who invaded the house of another man, and
thereby threatened his home and family, crossed the boundary of the
lawful, and thus moved beyond the protection of the law, into a
realm that suspended the restrictions on violence. 178

Some state laws expand the castle doctrine even further by
extending it to places outside the home. Although the castle doctrine has
roots in English and American common law, no-retreat rules that cover
other places are of more recent vintage. For example, some states permit
people to use deadly force without retreating if they are attacked in their
office 179 or in their vehicle. 180 “Stand your ground” laws extend the no
retreat rule everywhere, allowing a person to kill without retreating
from a conflict, even if he could have escaped danger by walking
away. 181 Like the castle doctrine, the stand your ground rule is not new.
Although English common law requires retreat, more than half the

research.org/documents/2015/04/shoot-first.pdf [https://perma.cc/D49N-FHAM] (stating that
castle doctrine “holds that a person has no duty to retreat before using deadly force if the
conflict takes place in his or her own home—the ‘castle.’”).
177 See SANGERO, supra note 65, at 268–70.
178 Suk, supra note 20, at 239.
179 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-411 (2019); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:20(3) (2019); see also SANGERO, supra note 65, at 274.
180 ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(d), (e), (i) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:20(3).
181 Ahmad Abuznaid et al., “Stand Your Ground” Laws: International Human Rights
Implications, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1129, 1132–34 (2014) (describing state statutory and
common law rules permitting deadly force without retreat). Most stand your ground laws apply
only to the non-aggressor. If a person starts a fight, he is still required to retreat before using
deadly force. However, many contain an exception providing that the aggressor may become
the non-aggressor, and therefore may stand his ground—as long as he withdraws from the fight
and the other person starts it again.
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American states have modified the English approach in favor of what is
often called the “true man” rule. 182
4.

Reasonableness and Procedural Changes

Some states have considered proposals to eliminate the
“reasonableness” requirement entirely, which would make a killing
justifiable if based on an honest fear, even if the fear is unreasonable and
incorrect. 183 Some have adopted laws that presume the existence of
reasonable fear in specific circumstances, including home defense. 184
Some have adopted immunity laws, which shift the burden of proof in
self-defense cases by prohibiting a prosecutor from bringing charges at
all unless sufficient evidence exists to disprove the self-defense case. 185

182

rules).

AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 48, at 17 (stating that thirty-three states now have no-retreat

183 Addie Rolnick, Expert Perspective: Race and Self-Defense Killings, UNLV (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.unlv.edu/news/article/lecture-preview-race-and-self-defense-killings
[https://
perma.cc/N3Z7-3RWK]. See, e.g., Karoun Demerjian, Trayvon Martin Case Has Some Looking
at Nevada’s New Self-Defense Law, LAS VEGAS SUN (Apr. 1, 2012, 2:00 AM), https://lasvegas
sun.com/news/2012/apr/01/trayvon-martin-case-has-some-looking-nevada-new-se
[https://
perma.cc/3DQP-56KN] (stating that “bare fear” laws have been introduced in three different
Nevada legislative sessions). The MPC’s self-defense provision also eliminates the
reasonableness requirements, but a killing carried out under a reckless or negligent belief that it
is justified is punishable as either manslaughter or negligent homicide, and states that follow
the Code’s approach incorporate a similar provision about reckless or negligent mistakes.
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04(1), 3.02(2) (1964); see also HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 703-304, 703302(c)(2) (2017) (adopting MPC approach); Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable?: Self-Defense
and Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2010).
184 E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.130(2) (West 2019) (establishing a rebuttable presumption
“that the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person” in cases of
forceful and unlawful entry into an occupied home or vehicle and where the victim is
committing or attempting a crime of violence); FLA. STAT. § 776.013(2) (West 2019)
(presumption of reasonable fear and imminent threat when the victim unlawfully and forcefully
enters an occupied home or vehicle); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-440(A) (2018) (same). See supra
note 10 (describing how the Nevada provision was considered and rejected in 2011, but
adopted in 2015).
185 See, e.g., Robert Christian Rutledge, Vigilant or Vigilante? Procedure and Rationale for
Immunity in Defense of Habitation and Defense of Property under the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated §§ 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and -24.2, 59 MERCER L. REV. 629, 630–38 (2008) (discussing
Georgia’s immunity provisions); Megale, supra note 35, at 119–28 (describing immunity laws in
Florida and elsewhere).
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These laws discourage review of self-defense claims by keeping more of
them out of courts and away from juries. Some states also provide civil
immunity against wrongful death suits for any person who is not
criminally convicted, further insulating the killer from any legal
accountability. 186
Expanded self-defense laws clarify that defensive lethal violence is a
desirable outcome in specific situations that might otherwise fall into a
grey area. Some of these changes, such as defense of habitation laws,
ensure that self-defense law will cover situations where it might be
needed but where the traditional requirements, such as imminent
deadly threat, might be too narrow to cover them. Others are nothing
more than signals because they cover situations that would likely have
led to successful claims under the traditional, narrow approach. For
example, Nevada recently passed a law that establishes a presumption of
imminent harm in cases of carjacking. There was no evidence presented
that Nevada’s existing self-defense laws were somehow inadequate to
cover self-defense killings in response to carjackings. The new law was
part of a bill containing several other expansions to Nevada’s selfdefense laws. Its importance was largely symbolic.
The home has long occupied a special place in the common law of
self-defense, and the earliest doctrines relaxing the basic requirements of
self-defense were centered there. Although the proportionality
requirement means that lethal force can be used to protect life, not
property, defense of habitation laws provide that lethal force is
justifiable if used to protect one’s home. 187 The castle doctrine alters the
necessity requirement by providing that a person attacked in his home is
not required to retreat before responding with deadly force, even if safe
retreat is available. As Jeanne Suk described, the importance of home

See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.095; TEX. PENAL CODE § 83.001 (West 2019).
To permit a resident to use deadly force against a home intruder, defense of habitation
laws may permit the resident to presume the existence of an imminent threat to the occupants
the moment someone enters a home, or they may authorize deadly force in response to a
threatened home intrusion. Some states, including Nevada, have statutes that incorporate both
approaches. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120 (deadly force authorized against someone who
enters a home); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.130(2)(a) (presumption of deadly threat when an
intruder enters the home). The relationship of these two approaches to the core requirements
of proportionality and imminence is discussed supra in Section I.C.1–2.
186
187
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defense was linked to the idea that masculinity included a special duty to
protect one’s home and family from outsiders.
The “true man” had a certain relationship and attitude toward his
home and family. A “true man” did whatever was necessary to
provide economically for his wife and children, who were dependent
on him. He was the source of strong moral guidance for his
vulnerable or needy wife or children. . . . The chivalry which makes
the strong sex the natural protector of the weak runs in every true
man’s blood. To be a “true man” was to be a man who supported and
protected a woman. . . . And similarly, a “true man” was protective of
children. . . . The “true man” rhetoric thus importantly valorized the
man’s role as protector of his home and family. 188

Presumption of threat laws accord more and more spaces homelike
status, allowing people to protect them in accordance with the same
principles described by Suk. Stand your ground and immunity laws,
which apply anywhere, effectively allow home defense to take place
anywhere. A resident who sees a suspicious person in the neighborhood
can follow and confront that person. If violence results, stand your
ground laws and immunity laws make it more likely the suspicion-based
violence will be legal.
One study compared states that enacted expanded self-defense laws
with states that had not. The study found that the new laws did not deter
burglary, robbery, or aggravated assault, but that they did lead to an
increase in criminal homicides (a category that excludes those that were
ruled justifiable). 189 The increase is consistent with the purpose and
function of these laws. As the authors explained, “[g]iven that the laws
reduce the expected costs associated with using violence, economic

Suk, supra note 20 at 244–45.
See generally Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime
or Escalate Violence? Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine, 48 J. HUM. RESOURCES 822
(2012). Based on additional analysis, the authors found it “unlikely, albeit not impossible” that
the increase in criminal homicides was entirely due to homicides that could have been, but were
not, ruled justified. Id. at 824. See also Chandler McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground
Laws, Homicides, and Injuries, 52 J. HUM. RESOURCES 621, 646–51 (2017) (finding that stand
your ground laws are associated with an increase in homicides and hospitalizations due to gun
injuries).
188
189
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theory would predict that there would be more of it.” 190 As might be
expected, the enactment of laws expanding the right of self-defense also
seems to increase the odds that a homicide will be ruled justified. 191
Empirical assessments of expanded self-defense laws are limited.192
In addition to increasing the number of killings and the likelihood that a
killing will be ruled justified, there is evidence that these laws might
worsen racial disparities in justifiable homicides. 193 As an American Bar
Association Task Force noted in a report that urged states to limit
expanded self-defense laws,
although racial disparities in the likelihood of being found to be
justified exist, in stand your ground states, the rate is significantly
higher, such that a white shooter that kills a black victim is 350%
more likely to be found to be justified than if the same shooter killed
a white victim. 194

In conclusion, the potential for racial bias is baked into every
stranger self-defense case, especially those involving cross-racial
encounters. And mechanisms intended to guard against the possibility
of bias, such as the reasonableness requirement and review by a jury,
provide only a minimal check and in some cases might operate to
enshrine biases into law. Rather than circumscribing self-defense in the
face of this reality, states have moved to expand the right of self-defense
by making it easier to claim and by insulating more claims from judicial
review. (However, states have not made similar statutory changes to
expand the right of self-defense in cases of women who kill abusive
partners, where scholars have provided the most documentation of the
need for an expansion).
Moreover, even the traditional common law approach to justifiable
homicide is more broad than is often assumed: each of the core
requirements of imminence, proportionality, and necessity can be
Id. at 836.
ROMAN, supra note 48, at 10 (being in a “stand your ground state” increased the odds
that a homicide would be ruled justified by 65%).
192 For a thorough account of existing assessments, their limitations, and the conflicting
conclusions drawn by various researchers about the deterrent and racial effects of expanded
self-defense laws, see Barnes, supra note 31 at 3190–96.
193 See id. at 3193.
194 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 48, at 20 (citing ROMAN, supra note 48).
190
191
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shortcut in specific scenarios. Stand your ground laws, immunity
provisions, and laws that extend the presumption of imminent threat to
non-home situations are some of the most far-reaching reforms, but
even less controversial state self-defense laws can insulate killers from
trial and punishment, particularly when defense of home or
neighborhood is at issue. When DeMarcus Carter died, Nevada had not
adopted the kind of expansions scrutinized in Florida. Its century-old
self-defense and defense of habitation laws were more than enough to
shield Carter’s killer from scrutiny. Because those laws require only a
reasonable assessment of fear, they allow a resident to presume a deadly
threat in the case of a suspected home intruder, and allow a person to
defend against a suspected break-in. And because prosecutors will often
decide not to charge someone who has a strong self-defense claim,
Nevada’s basic self-defense laws can easily immunize anyone who
shoots an unfamiliar figure through the door. Whether the victim is
armed, and whether he really intends to do harm, is irrelevant.
II. FEAR, SURVEILLANCE, AND KILLING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD
Having carefully examined the interplay between race and selfdefense law, this Article now considers how the doctrinal framework of
self-defense can function in residential neighborhoods. A self-defense
claim is premised on a recitation of fear and an assertion of that fear to a
decision-maker, who will either confirm the asserted fear as reasonable,
thus legalizing the killing, or reject it, transforming the killing into a
murder. Taken as a whole, the framework described in Part I
communicates the idea that violence is acceptable as long as it is enacted
out of a snap judgment about fear. The collection of rules described in
the previous Part confirm that such violence is even more likely to be
permissible when it happens in the context of home defense and when it
conforms to the narrative of men as protectors of women in homes. The
trend toward adding new shortcuts and immunities serves as a reminder
that this brand of violence is permitted, and perhaps even encourages
civilians to use it.
While actual killings in self-defense are rare, a legal framework that
condones violence in service of fear has important expressive and
material consequences once it is acknowledged that fear is racialized. In
the context of modern residential segregation, expanded self-defense

Rolnick.40.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

5/17/2019 10:04 AM

DEFENDING WHITE SPACE

1691

laws affirm White ownership of White-identified neighborhoods and
reinforce the outsider status of Black residents. They carve out the
possibility for legalized lethal violence against people who appear “out of
place” and also create space for White residents to enact lesser forms of
violence on their Black neighbors under cover of the same fear. While
Black people are no longer formally excluded from White spaces, and
while openly racist private violence is now illegal, the law of justifiable
homicide communicates the idea that private violence is permitted and
desirable when enacted in the name of home defense and against people
who are believed to be threatening or out-of-place.
Spaces—neighborhoods, cities, and counties—have been and
continue to be racially segregated, and racially identifiable, in the United
States. The idea that certain geographical spaces have a racially
identifiable character is not new, 195 and neither is the role of law in
creating and maintaining those spaces. Yet, as the typical legal tools of
segregation (from public housing plans to racially restrictive covenants)
have been repealed or rejected, modern segregation has come to be
viewed as a social or economic problem rather than a legal one.196
Segregation is still reinforced by law, but one may need to look more
deeply to see the relationship. 197 Self-defense law, which is unavoidably
linked to racial fear and which states have consistently expanded despite
its potential for bias, is one legal tool that reinforces modern segregation
195 See John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: “Hewing a Stone of
Hope from a Mountain of Despair,” 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1235 (1995) (“[R]acialization of
space” is “the process by which residential location and community are carried and placed on
racial identity.”).
196 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 1–2 (1993) (“If residential segregation persist, [most
Americans] reason, it is only because civil rights laws passed during the 1960s have not had
time to work or because many blacks still prefer to live in black neighborhoods. The residential
segregation of blacks is viewed charitably as a ‘natural’ outcome of impersonal social and
economic forces . . . .”). Scholars also highlight social and economic factors as drivers of
segregation. See, e.g., David R. Harris, “Property Values Drop When Blacks Move in,
Because . . .”: Racial and Socioeconomic Determinants of Neighborhood Desirability, 64 AM. SOC.
REV. 461, 476 (1999) (“The conclusion that people generally avoid black neighbors for reasons
that are related to social class bodes well for stable integration. When black residents and their
neighbors have similar socioeconomic statuses, increasing levels of integration should have
little effect on property values, and white flight should not ensue.”).
197 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at xiii (describing legal and popular “willful blindness” to
the governmental role in segregation).
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by offering government approval and encouragement to private
neighborhood violence in service of racial fears.
State legislatures, by enacting far-reaching expansions to the
already-broad law of self-defense, absolve private citizens of legal
responsibility for violence and encourage them to take over the work of
crime control. In neighborhood protection scenarios, these laws
legitimize collective fear of Black intruders and give people greater
license to act on that fear through violence, absent any demonstration
that people in their homes face any increased risk of crime. Statesanctioned private violence is an old story when it comes to racial
control and segregation. But it is also a new story. Demands for greater
police accountability should not distract us from scrutinizing the kinds
of private violence that go unpunished by state criminal laws; private
violence is also an integral part of the machinery of White supremacy,
and state legislatures quietly encourage it when they enact and expand
criminal laws that legalize it.
This Part explores the relationship between segregated
neighborhoods, fear, private violence, and self-defense law. Sections II.A
and II.B rebut the colorblind argument that there is no such thing as a
White-identified neighborhood today and that, to the extent majorityWhite neighborhoods exist, they are an accident of social interaction.
Section II.A shows how official and private discrimination have always
worked hand-in-hand to enforce residential segregation in service of
racial hierarchy, so that an effort to isolate one law, policy or decision
and ask whether that decision is state or private action provides an
incomplete picture. 198 Section II.B looks specifically at newly
This point is descriptive. The distinction between state and private action has been a
recurring theme in civil rights law, and many scholars have demonstrated the way it has been
used to shield ongoing discrimination from the reach of the constitution. See, e.g., Erika K.
Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in Education Through the No Child Left Behind
Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 635–44, 649 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s remedial school desegregation jurisprudence places the problem of school segregation
caused by residential segregation outside the purview of the federal courts’ remedial powers.
The underlying rationale behind the Court's reasoning appears to be that residential
segregation is a matter of private choice rather than intentional state action.”); see generally
Reva B. Seigel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997) (describing how several key distinctions—
public/private, social rights/civil rights, and intentionally discriminatory/race neutral—have
helped insulate discrimination from constitutional scrutiny). I do not seek here to revisit the
198
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constructed suburban neighborhoods to identify the way that laws help
to create and sustain White spaces, even in the absence of a direct
history of de jure segregation. 199 Sections II.C and II.D locate the
dynamics of home defense in these new White spaces. Section II.C
describes how state laws invite private violence in the name of home
protection and increasingly insulate that violence from review. By doing
so, self-defense laws reinforce White ownership of White spaces while
increasing Black vulnerability to state-sanctioned killing in those same
spaces. Section II.D links the legal framework of self-defense to acts of
precursor violence, such as posting photos of people who appear
suspicious, following people, and calling the police. While lethal
defensive violence in these neighborhoods is rare, self-defense doctrine
offers a script of fear that White residents can invoke when carrying out
these lesser—but much more common—acts of violence.
A.

Segregation and Private Violence

Physical separation has been an essential tool of racial hierarchy
since European settlement of North America. 200 Spatial boundaries have
state action doctrine or to argue that a constitutional remedy is necessary for private
neighborhood violence. As Erwin Chemerinsky has noted, the common law and state statutory
law protect individuals from each other, a function served here by state criminal law. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 511 (1985). Constitutional
intervention has been necessary where states, through their application of statutory and
common law, failed to protect the rights of non-White people. In this Article, I take the
preliminary step of asking states to do a better job of protecting Black people by rethinking selfdefense law. I encourage careful attention to state substantive criminal law and, for the reasons
described in the conclusion, I believe that pressure on state legislatures is the most likely avenue
to generate reform.
199 Writing about the government’s role in twentieth century residential segregation,
Richard Rothstein explains that private discrimination “played a role, but it would have been
considerably less effective had it not been embraced and reinforced by the government.”
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at xii.
200 In addition to the role of physical separation in maintaining the White/Black racial
hierarchy, federal Indian policy through the late 1800s was dedicated to finding a way to
designate separate areas for indigenous peoples while accommodating increasing White desire
for land. See Angela R. Riley, The History of Native American Lands and the Supreme Court, 38
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 369, 373–74 (2013) (describing removal, reservation and allotment policies).
Location was therefore one way federal officials differentiated between White and Indian
people. See William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal) Jurisdiction, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 415,
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worked in tandem with legal and social ones. When racial status
differences have been starkly defined in law and social interaction,
geographic integration does not present a threat to White dominance. 201
As legal rules about race and status have become more fluid, residential
segregation has become starker. 202 This use of residential segregation to
underscore White supremacy has always been a public-private
partnership. Laws and legal institutions have reflected and shaped social
reality; private racism and violence have inspired and enforced legal
rules. 203 In order to place the relationship between private violence, selfdefense law, and modern segregation in historical context, this Section
considers the different ways that public and private discrimination have
relied on and reinforced each other to produce residential segregation.
1.

State-Sponsored Segregation Enforced by Private Violence

The most obvious relationship between law and segregation occurs
when laws expressly designate racial neighborhood boundaries and
courts enforce those boundaries. Residential segregation laws, the local
laws that explicitly designated certain areas as White and other areas as
non-White, hardened the spatial boundary between White and Black
people who lived in the same cities once the definitional line of slavery
disappeared and African Americans began to migrate to cities in large

466 n.203 (2016) (describing how federal officials determined who counted as Indian based on
whether or not the person maintained a “tribal relation,” including asking whether a person
lived in a tribal community or “mingled with the white population” in cities).
201 JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF
RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 11–12 (2013) (explaining that Black and White
people lived in close proximity during slavery and in the North before the Civil War).
202 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1121, 1153–57; BELL, supra note 201, at 12–15
(explaining that Black and White people continued to live in the same neighborhoods
immediately after the Civil War in both Northern and Southern cities but “by the 1890s the
springtime of race relations had begun to subside into a cold, harsh winter . . . [and] onceblurry [geographic] racial lines began to solidify”).
203 As Ian Haney-López explained in his analysis of racial category rules, “the law serves not
only to reflect but to solidify social prejudice.” Ian Haney-López, The Social Construction of
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3
(1994).
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numbers. 204 This was also the era of “sundown towns,” which were
separate towns and suburbs established as all-White communities across
the North, Midwest, and West between 1890 and the 1930s and named
for the signs that were often posted at the incorporated limit warning
Black people (and sometimes Chinese, Mexican, or Indian people) not
to be caught in town after sundown. 205 Some towns did this by requiring
all housing developments to include racially restrictive covenants; others
passed ordinances that barred Black people from local businesses; some
simply posted signs at the edge of town or relied on custom and
reputation. 206 The Supreme Court outlawed local segregation
ordinances in 1917 in Buchanan v. Warley, 207 but it did so largely on the
theory that they interfered with the property rights of White
homeowners who wished to sell their houses to Black buyers. 208 Some
states blatantly ignored the Court’s holding, passing and enforcing racial
zoning ordinances well into the late twentieth century. 209
The intertwined nature of state law enforcement and private racial
violence contributed to the urgent need for federal intervention via early
civil rights statutes. State law enforcement and courts were “either
unwilling or unable” to stop the Ku Klux Klan’s organized campaign of
racial violence. 210 Private violence, and local government acquiescence
204 See Roger L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910–1917, 34 J. S. HIST. 179 (1968);
George C. Wright, The NAACP and Residential Segregation in Louisville, Kentucky, 1914–1917,
78 REG. KY. HIST. SOC’Y 39 (1980). State and local governments claimed these laws “promote[d]
peace by preventing race conflicts.” Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 73 (1917); see Marc
Seitles, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical
Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE &
ENV’T L. 89 (1998) (describing the role of explicitly racial zoning ordinances in maintaining
neighborhood segregation).
205 See generally JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF
AMERICAN RACISM (2005). According to Loewen, the phenomenon of all-White towns came
first, followed by all-White suburbs beginning in about 1890; these policies persisted through
the 1960s. Id. at 4.
206 Id. at 4.
207 Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 82.
208 Id. at 81. The Court contrasted such an infringement on property rights with laws
requiring segregation in transportation and education, which at the time were legal. Id. at 79–
81.
209 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at vii–viii.
210 Eric Foner, Rights and the Constitution in Black Life During the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 74 J. AM. HIST. 863, 881 (1987) (identifying the Klan’s racial violence, and
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or encouragement, was similarly essential in enforcing the municipal
ordinance or policies excluding Black people from sundown towns. For
example, James Loewen recounts how Black exclusion was
accomplished in Vienna, Illinois during the summer of 1954 when
White residents were “deputized” to find two Black men accused in a
killing and attempted rape. 211 The White residents “sacked the entire
[B]lack community,” burned houses, and forced the town’s Black
residents out, leaving the town all-White. 212 Private violence was also
used to keep out Black residents who tried to move in to White towns or
neighborhoods. A partnership between public and private racism also
greeted Harvey Clark, who tried to move into an apartment in Cicero,
Illinois, a White suburb of Chicago. Local police tried to stop Clark by
saying he needed a permit and referring to an ordinance he was
allegedly violating. When a court ordered the police to stop interfering
with his move, local residents gathered to shout at Clark, and later to
burn his building and destroy his furniture while the police watched. 213
2.

“Neutral” State Action in Service of Private Racism

Explicit, openly segregationist laws and policies were replaced in
the second half of the twentieth century by facially neutral governments
policies and programs that were employed with the goal of maintaining
residential segregation. 214 Laws were intentionally and sometimes
blatantly employed to create and support residential segregation because
government officials understood that the White population that was the
target of housing and home ownership initiatives did not “care to
associate with” Black families, a sentiment likely shared by those

states’ failure to stop it, as the primary reason southern Blacks turned to the federal government
to vindicate their rights). See also Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A
Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 535–37 (1985).
211 LOEWEN, supra note 205, at 10.
212 Id. at 10.
213 Id. at 10–11.
214 See Deborah Kenn, Paradise Unfound: The American Dream of Housing Justice for All, 5
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 69, 84 (1995) (describing how racial segregation resulted from “intentional,
direct housing policies of the federal, state and local governments”).
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officials. 215 These rules and programs lent the force of law to the private
preferences of White homeowners.
The federal programs that created post-war suburbs, including
funding for mortgages, highways, and utilities, were administered in a
way that ensured the new suburbs would be White spaces. 216 The Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and Federal Housing
Administration, both created to facilitate middle-class homeownership,
adopted policies that made assistance dependent on racial segregation.
The HOLC assessed the relative risk of borrower neighborhoods using a
color-coded system in which green (indicating the least risk) was
assigned to middle-class White neighborhoods and red (indicating the
most risk) was assigned to Black neighborhoods. 217 Rothstein explains
that, through the production and dissemination of these maps, the
federal government approved and encouraged racial discrimination by

ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at 60–61.
James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America: A Historical and Legal Analysis of
Contemporary Racial Segregation in the United States, 22 HOW. L.J. 547, 565–70 (1979);
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 196, at 52–54. Most famously, the Federal Housing
Administration issued loans to the developers of Levittown on the condition that the deed to
the houses in the new suburb would all contain racially restrictive covenants. ROTHSTEIN, supra
note 24, at 70–71.
217 See BRUCE MITCHELL & JUAN FRANCO, HOLC “REDLINING” MAPS: THE PERSISTENCE
STRUCTURE OF SEGREGATION AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 18 (2018), https://ncrc.org/wpcontent/uploads/dlm_uploads/2018/02/NCRC-Research-HOLC-10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
N5FQ-47UC] (concluding that federally-created risk maps correspond to present-day patterns
segregation and economic inequality patterns, especially in the South and West). Mitchell and
Franco describe how
215
216

HOLC examiners consulted with local bank loan officers, city officials, appraisers,
and realtors to create ‘Residential Security’ maps of cities. More than 150 of these
maps still exist. The examiners systematically graded neighborhoods based on
criteria related to the age and condition of housing, transportation access, closeness
to amenities such as parks or disamenities like polluting industries, the economic
class and employment status of residents, and their ethnic and racial composition.
Neighborhoods were color-coded on maps: green for the “Best,” blue for “Still
Desirable,” yellow for “Definitely Declining,” and red for “Hazardous.”
Id. at 5. Redlining “put the federal government on record as judging that African Americans,
simply because of their race, were poor risks.” ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at 64. The practice of
assessing loan risk based on the racial character of a neighborhood persists today in the
practices of private mortgage and credit lenders. Freeman, supra note 88, at 1097–98.
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lenders. 218 Federal community development funding was used to
redevelop urban neighborhoods, displacing minority residents when
White homeowners and business owners moved in. 219
Local governments were also important architects of segregation.
Some towns replaced racial zoning ordinances with economic zoning
rules crafted to enforce racial boundaries but also to pass muster under
Buchanan. 220 Some zoning rules created exclusive, high-income
neighborhoods, then made it impossible for poor people, many of
whom were Black, to move into those neighborhoods. 221 Other rules
protected White neighborhoods against undesirable uses, such as toxic
industries and waste disposal, steering those dangerous polluters into
unprotected lower income, largely Black neighborhoods. 222 Together,
zoning rules kept Black people out of White spaces, increased the
desirability of those spaces, and created unsafe and unhealthy
conditions in Black neighborhoods. 223

218 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at 63–64. But see Amy E. Hiller, Redlining and the
Homeowner’s Loan Corporation, 29 J. URB. HIST. 394, 396–420, 412 (2003) (arguing that the
HLOC maps, while demonstrating racist on the part of the federal government, did not directly
cause redlining because lenders were already engaging in it and relied on other sources).
219 Kushner, supra note 216, at 559–60.
220 Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN PLANNING
AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 23, 25 (June Manning Thomas &
Marsha Ritzdorf eds., 1997) (explaining that, after Buchanan, “cities hired prominent planning
professionals to fashion legally defensible racial zoning plans”).
221 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at 56–57.
222 Id. at 57.
223 Silver, supra note 220, at 38 (describing how “race-based planning” continued the
process of creating and maintaining racially segregated cities into the middle of the twentieth
century); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at 55 (describing zoning rules that concentrated industrial
and toxic land uses to Black neighborhoods and kept them out of White neighborhoods);
Richard Rothstein, Race and Public Housing: Revisiting the Federal Role, 21 POVERTY & RACE 1,
1–2 (2012) (explaining how site choice and screening requirements ensured that the most
desirable public housing developments were majority-White and located in White
neighborhoods, while those accessible to Black families were located in Black neighborhoods);
Seitles, supra note 204, at 92–97 (describing the deliberate creation of racialized urban ghettos).
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State-Sanctioned Private Racism

While it outlawed explicitly racist segregation laws, Buchanan left
private discrimination untouched. 224 It would be another fifty years
before the force of law was employed to decry private discrimination. In
1968, the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. held that Section 1982 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited private discrimination. 225
Congress also passed the Fair Housing Act. 226 That law sought to ensure
that anyone, regardless of race, has the right to own or rent a home in
any neighborhood. 227 The temporal gap between Buchanan, which
outlawed official residential segregation laws, and Jones, which
confirmed that Congress had the power to forbid private
discrimination, suggests the importance of private actors in maintaining
segregation and the degree to which courts and lawmakers have been
willing to support private segregationist efforts.
Even without local laws explicitly designating racial boundaries,
neighborhood segregation was maintained by private White
homeowners’ individual and collective preferences. 228 The legal system
224 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 80, 82 (1917) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting a
White property owner from selling his home to a Black buyer violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s prohibition against “state interference with property rights”); Corrigan v.
Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330–31 (1926) (holding that the neither the constitution nor Section
1982 “in any manner prohibit or invalidate contracts entered into by private individuals in
respect to the control and disposition of their own property”).
225 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
226 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 83 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2018)).
227 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b) (outlawing discrimination in sale, rental, conditions, and
advertising “because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”); Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2018) (“[A]ll persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, . . . of every race and color” have “the same right, in every
State and Territory in the United States, . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”); Jones, 392 U.S. at 424–37, 443
(holding that Congress intended to outlaw private discrimination in Section 1982 and that the
Thirteenth Amendment empowered it to do so).
228 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at 78 (noting that private deed restrictions prohibiting resale
to blacks and other disfavored groups “spread throughout the country in the 1920s as the
preferred means to evade” Buchanan). Individual deeds between seller and buyer were not
always enforceable by others in the neighborhood, so “increasingly in the twentieth century,
racial covenants took the form of a contract among all owners in the neighborhood.” Id. at 79.
Subdivision developers also created all-White community associations before putting homes up
for sale and made membership in the association a condition of buying a home. Id. The all-
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enshrined these private racial preferences in a variety of ways, most
famously through judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants. 229 Although the Court ruled in 1948 that judicial
enforcement of private housing discrimination constituted state
action, 230 racially restrictive covenants still appear in the deeds attached
to homes across the country. 231 In generational terms, many people
living and working today either lived through this type of express
residential segregation as children or have parents who did so.
Today, most laws are at least neutral as to race, and private
discrimination in property and housing is illegal. Everyone is also
equally entitled to defend their home, including the right to keep and
use a firearm to protect their home and family. 232 Moreover, a person
who makes the decision to exclude someone from a neighborhood or to
threaten or hurt someone because of that person’s race can face criminal
and civil sanctions. 233 Yet, laws that are race-neutral in language and

White character of these communities, then, was an important component in their planning. In
neighborhoods where sales were made subject to these covenants, sale and leasing to Blacks was
never permitted, but other groups (e.g., individuals of Jewish, Chinese, Indian, and Mexican
descent) were sometimes targeted for exclusion as well. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 21 n.26
(1948); Michael Jones-Correa, The Origins and Diffusion of Racially Restrictive Covenants, 115
POL. SCI. Q. 541, 544 (2001). The particular groups excluded varied from place to place, so that
the covenants provided a snapshot of each location’s particular racial hierarchy.
229 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at 81–83 (describing federal court enforcement of covenants,
local government promotion of them, and federal actors’ assurance that such covenants were
legal as private agreements).
230 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19–21; see Thomas B. MacAffee, Shelley v. Kramer: Herald of Social
Progress and of the Coming Debate Over the Limits of Constitutional Change, 34 ST. LOUIS B.J. 1,
18–19 (1987).
231 See, e.g., Motoko Rich, Restrictive Racial Covenants Slow to Disappear, CHI. TRIBUNE
(May 1, 2005), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2005-05-01-0505010501-story.
html [http://perma.cc/CGQ9-5DYM] (describing how the covenants, though unenforceable,
continue to appear in deeds, sometimes causing individual sellers to discriminate because of
what they believe is a legal obligation).
232 For a description of race neutral home defense laws, see supra Sections I.C.1 & I.C.2; U.S.
CONST. amend. II.
233 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (2018) (making it a federal crime to interfere with housing
rights on the basis of race); 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2018) (making it a crime to violate a person’s civil
rights); 18 U.S.C. § 241(2018) (making it a crime to conspire to violate a person’s civil rights);
see Jonathan Zasloff, The Secret History of the Fair Housing Act, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 247,
250–51 (2016) (describing enforcement provisions in the Fair Housing Act).
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intent may nonetheless reinforce or reflect private prejudices or
historical inequality. They calcify a segregated status quo.
Whether this is viewed as a within the reach of legal remedy turns
on the idea of state versus private action. Institutional actors may not
give effect to the overt racism of private citizens. In the property law
context, courts may not enforce private agreements between
homeowners to racially discriminate. 234 In the criminal law context,
private violence between neighbors that is explicitly motivated by race is
a crime. On the other hand, courts treat neutral laws that reflect but do
not actively enforce private racism as beyond the reach of legal
remedy. 235
Despite the demonstrated intent of White homeowners to exclude
non-Whites from White communities, and the central role played by
federal and state policy in facilitating this exclusion, residential
segregation is treated by modern courts as a matter of personal choice,
unbounded from historical forces and unreachable by legal remedy. For
example, the Supreme Court has refused to permit inter-district
remedies to counter school segregation, holding that the importance of
local control over schools meant that courts could not require the
redistribution of students or resources between districts. 236 Justice
Stewart’s concurring option in Milliken v. Bradley elaborated further on
the view that de facto residential segregation is not necessarily
connected to de jure segregation and is therefore beyond the reach of
legal remedy. According to Justice Stewart, the fact that Detroit’s school
system was majority Black, while suburban schools were majority
White, was “caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable factors such
as in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumulative acts of
private racial fears” and therefore could not serve as the basis for a race
conscious legal remedy. 237 Two decades later, Justice Thomas,
concurring in Missouri v. Jenkins, similarly argued that “[t]he
continuing ‘racial isolation’ of schools after de jure segregation has
See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 11.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at xii–xiv (tracing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s view
that racially segregated neighborhoods are a matter of societal discrimination but that this sort
of segregation and its effects, such as segregated schools, was a matter of private choice and not
illegal unless caused or directly enabled by state action).
236 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 748–53 (1974).
237 Id. at 753 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
234
235
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ended may well reflect voluntary housing choices or other private
decisions” that are beyond the reach of law. 238
The Court’s colorblind and ahistorical approach to questions of
race discrimination (at least as a matter of equal protection) obscured
the link between residential segregation as a historical practice (clearly
understood to be a function of racism, nearly complete, and often
enforced by violence) and residential segregation today (understood to
be a function of social preferences, not complete, and not linked to
violence). Although cities and neighborhoods continue to be racially
identifiable as a social matter, 239 courts and individuals often adopt a
colorblind approach, denying that spaces are segregated if they are not
governed by rigid exclusionary rules. One consequence of this is that, in
the absence of clear evidence of intentional discrimination, courts’
constitutional analyses about discrimination—and consequent legal
remedy—do not address the relationship between race and spatial
exclusion, instead “read[ing] racial geography out of the equal
protection framework”240 But this is a mistake. Although it is less direct
than in the past, law still plays an important role in maintaining
residential segregation.
B.

New White Spaces

“[T]he white space,” a “perceptual category” understood by Blacks
to include “overwhelmingly white neighborhoods . . . that reinforce[] a
normative sensibility in settings in which [B]lack people are typically
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 116 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
See Sherene Razack, When Place Becomes Race, in RACE, SPACE, AND THE LAW:
UNMAPPING A WHITE SETTLER SOCIETY 7–10 (Sherene Razack ed., 2002).
240 Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 401, 421 (2010). Professor Boddie
provides a compelling example of the effect of spatial colorblindness with the story of the
Gretna Bridge in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Black residents of New
Orleans, a majority Black city, were blocked by police when they tried to cross the bridge to
shelter in neighboring Gretna, a majority White suburb. She describes how the failure of law to
recognize the existence of racialized spaces in law meant that Blacks who were blocked from
crossing the bridge could not make out a claim for racial discrimination absent evidence of
individual racist intent on the part of specific police officers. Boddie argues that the racial
character of geographic spaces should inform constitutional claims of “racial territoriality,”
defined as the exclusion of people of color from (or their marginalization within) Whiteidentified spaces. Id. at 445–47.
238
239
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absent, not expected, or marginalized when present,” 241 exists in every
city. White spaces are not limited to the South or to Black Rust Belt
cities, where White residents are simply using new tools to carry
forward a legacy of de jure segregation. White spaces and fear of
Blackness are so embedded in the popular psyche that this dynamic of
private violence in defense of White space occurs even where it is not
predated by official segregation. While White neighborhoods today may
not be all White and are not racially exclusive by law, they remain
racially identifiable. These White spaces have been shaped by law, and
law—though less visibly—continues to help maintain them. This
observation is particularly important in newer urban and suburban
neighborhoods, including those in Sun Belt cities, some of which postdate officially-sponsored segregation. 242
Segregation today is not necessarily absolute, but cities and
neighborhoods may still be regarded as Black or White spaces, and the
racial character of these neighborhoods is neither accidental nor
divorced from law and history. 243 For example, although Las Vegas,
Elijah Anderson, The White Space, 1 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 10 (2015).
See John Iceland et al., Sun Belt Rising: Regional Population Change and the Decline in
Black Residential Segregation, 1970–2009, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 97, 98 (2013) (“growing Sun Belt
cities—such as Austin, Phoenix, and Las Vegas—have less of an entrenched history of blackwhite conflict to contend with and more ethnically diverse populations that render black white
divisions less important”); id. at 100 (“Many high-growth areas in the South and West may
have less of a history of racial animosity and fewer entrenched neighborhoods than relatively
stratified and stagnant areas in the Northeast and Midwest.”); Patricia A. Bell & Wade Smith,
Racial Residential Segregation in the Sun Belt, 16 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 181, 192 (1985) (in
contrast to northern frost belt cities, “sun belt cities are often developing around one industry;
especially one which experiences growth in spite of, perhaps because of, a national recession;
and one which is often oriented toward advanced technology. (The plans to develop Phoenix
and Albuquerque as silicon metropoli are offered as examples.) These fast growing areas offer
little possibility of transferring skills in the dominant growth industries to other productive
sectors. The results suggest that population growth in the sun belt is accompanied by inmigration and that this in-migration is a considerable factor in attenuating racial residential
segregation.”). See also Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, Changes in the Segregation of
Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society, 59 AM.
SOC. REV. 23, 32–38 (1994) (age of city, age of housing stock, industry specialization, and
region all affect the level of segregation in modern cities).
243 Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1850–51 (1994); Richard Thompson Ford, Urban Space and the Color
Line: The Consequences of Demarcation and Disorientation in the Postmodern Metropolis, 9
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 117, 127 (1992).
241
242
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where Carter was killed, did not have laws mandating residential
segregation, “the years between 1931 and the 1960s marked a legacy of
segregated public accommodations (e.g., restaurants, shows, and
casinos), discriminatory employment practices, and racially segregated
housing and schools, earning Las Vegas the nickname ‘Mississippi of the
West.’” 244 As African Americans moved to Las Vegas from Southern
cities during this period, they settled in West Las Vegas, partly in
response to White efforts to keep them out of downtown neighborhoods
and partly because newcomers gravitated toward the vibrant Black
community. 245 Residential segregation was persistent enough that Las
Vegas’ largely segregated elementary school system was the subject of a
1968 lawsuit, and the school board eventually adopted a mandatory
busing plan to desegregate schools. 246
As Las Vegas’ Latinx population grew between 1980 and 1990, the
Westside became a mixed Black and Latinx neighborhood. 247 While
Blacks and Latinxs live in all areas of the city today, the Westside is still
regarded as a Black space. At the other end of the spectrum are the
newer suburban communities at the edges of town, including
Summerlin. Compared to the rest of Las Vegas, Summerlin’s population
is more White and Asian, and less Black and Latinx. 248 This is not to say
that Black and Latinx families do not live in Summerlin, but
Summerlin’s neighborhoods are predominantly White spaces. 249 When
the influx of Black and Latinx residents reaches a tipping point,
however, White residents work harder to police the boundaries and
preserve the Whiteness of the neighborhood. 250
244 Sonya D. Horsford, Carrie Sampson & Felicia Forletta, School Resegregation in the
Mississippi of the West: Community Counternarratives on the Return to Neighborhood Schools in
Las Vegas, 1968–1994, 115 TCHRS. C. REC. 1, 7 (2013).
245 Id.
246 Id. at 4.
247 Id. at 8.
248 See supra note 2.
249 Id. For an example of popular understandings of Summerlin as a racialized space, see
Summerlin Reviews, NICHE, https://www.niche.com/places-to-live/n/summerlin-las-vegas-nv/
reviews [https://perma.cc/AN36-ZVQJ] (including reviews that describe Summerlin as “safe,
secure,” “upscale,” and “a very white area”) (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
250 Scholars describe a kind of racial tipping point in which “the fraction of same-race
neighbors determines Whites’ attachment to neighborhood identities based on racial
homogeneity.” Robert DeFina & Lance Hannon, Diversity, Racial Threat, and Metropolitan
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The physical layout and architectural features of suburban
neighborhoods help do that. In Western and Sun Belt suburbs, clusters
of carefully planned neighborhoods are built around cul-de-sacs,
marked by a single entrance, and often enclosed by a wall or gate. 251
These features minimize the likelihood that a stranger might pass
through the neighborhood for an innocent reason, giving residents a
further basis for believing that an unfamiliar person is out of place or up
to no good. Access may be restricted by guards and identification
requirements. Many of these communities were built long after legal
segregation ended, giving them a sort of post-racial status, but many are
still “white spaces” where Black residents and visitors risk being seen as
“out of place.”
Continued residential segregation may be attributable in part to
private beliefs and actions, but various legal tools provide the
mechanisms through which private preferences are enforced. To
understand the way that law supports segregation in new White spaces,
it is important to look beyond public housing policy and zoning.
Although the decision to sell or rent property can no longer be based on
race, housing can legally be denied based on a host of other factors that
may correlate with race, such as receipt of government housing
assistance, violation of neighborhood-imposed rules of aesthetics and
decorum, and even personal dislike. Homeowners’ Associations (HOAs)
govern planned communities and impose hundreds of pages of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions on the properties included in

Housing Segregation, 88 SOC. FORCES 373, 374 (2009); see Michelle Wilde Anderson & Victoria
C. Plaut, Property Law, Implicit Bias, and the Resilience of Spatial Colorlines, in IMPLICIT
RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 25, 28–29 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert D. Smith eds., 2012)
(White level of comfort with a neighborhood varies depending on the proportion of non-White
neighbors). See, e.g., Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1153, 1168–75; see also Megan Messerly,
Study Reveals Where White Nevadans Rank for Racial Bias, LAS VEGAS SUN (Nov. 9, 2015, 12:46
PM),
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/nov/09/study-reveals-where-white-nevadans-rankfor-racial [http://perma.cc/XR3V-W597] (describing study showing that implicit bias among
Nevada Whites increased when Whites perceive greater competition from Blacks).
251 See Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through
Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE. L.J. 1934, 1958 (2015) (analyzing how
urban architecture facilitates racial segregation, including highways that separate cities from
suburbans and the “walls, gates and guardhouses” of gated communities that “serve to keep out
those who are not expressly allowed in”).
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the neighborhood. 252 While race per se is no longer enforceable as a
reason to exclude, occupants can be penalized or evicted for violation of
myriad HOA rules. 253
Exclusion of individuals and families from housing based on any of
these factors can perpetuate racial segregation in three ways. First, any
of these factors can easily supply a pretext for exclusion of people of
color where the desire to keep them out is, at base, motivated by racial
animosity or racial stereotypes. Second, even if the decision-maker’s
motivation is not consciously affected by race, exclusion of groups like
poor people, large families, or neighbors that are perceived as loud,
unclean, or unlikable will often disproportionately result in the
exclusion of people of color from spaces controlled by Whites because
White people may associate negative traits with non-White people, and
vice versa. 254 Third, unconscious bias may color decisions to exclude
that the decision-maker genuinely believes are based on a non-racial
factor.
Once granted access to White neighborhoods, people of color may
be subject to scrutiny by their neighbors, and the law provides a range of
mechanisms that residents can use to police and even remove an
unwanted neighbor. For example, the strict rules associated with Section
8 housing, and the requirement that recipients of assistance remain
subject to searches and interviews by the housing authority to determine
whether they are in compliance with these rules, have been used by
White residents to exclude poor Black women who receive Section 8
252 See Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common, 23
PEPP. L. REV. 1, 20 (1995) (“Under the aegis of the declaration and CC&Rs, these HOAs operate
as powerful private ‘mini-governments.’”).
253 See, e.g., Lorraine Longhi, ‘No, You Can’t,’ Condo Owner Says to HOA after Alleged Age
and Race Discrimination, AZ CENTRAL (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/
money/business/consumers/2018/08/27/phoenix-hoa-sunrise-village-condominiumsassociation-accused-age-race-discrimination/838620002 [https://perma.cc/6DA7-5G5H].
254 For example, homeowners in affluent White suburbs may choose not to accept Section 8
vouchers, effectively prohibiting low income voucher recipients, many of whom are Black
women, from moving into the neighborhoods. Laura Sullivan, Section 8 Vouchers Help the
Poor—But Only if Housing Is Available, NPR (May 10, 2017, 4:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/
2017/05/10/527660512/section-8-vouchers-help-the-poor-but-only-if-housing-is-available
[https://perma.cc/WU2M-5B55] (quoting a resident of McKinney, Texas as saying she opposes
efforts to open local housing to Section 8 recipients because “[t]he lifestyle that goes with
Section 8 is usually working, single moms or people who are struggling to keep their heads
above water. . . . It’s just not people who are the same class as us.”).
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assistance from their neighborhoods. 255 In a similar manner, HOAs
regularly survey houses in their communities to identify any failure to
comply with HOA rules. A resident can be cited for any violation, no
matter how minor, and may be subject to fees and even exclusion for
repeated or unaddressed violations. 256
Private violence, too, remains a powerful tool of residential
segregation. 257 Jeannine Bell has documented how Black families still
experience “move in violence” when they arrive in White spaces. 258 As
Bell explains, neighborhood violence today tends to be individual, rather
than collective violence imposed by groups like the Klan in an earlier
era. 259 The incidents of targeted violence described by Bell are almost
certainly illegal, even if the law is not always enforced. 260
However, neighbor-on-neighbor violence justified by fear of a
person who looks unfamiliar and out of place may be legal under the
law of self-defense described in the previous Part. This is likely to be the
case if a defendant can convince a factfinder that she was genuinely
afraid that the victim planned to harm her or break into her house,
especially if the defendant did not know or recognize the victim,
meaning the victim would have been unfamiliar and out-of-place in an
area in which people expect to feel safe. The law of fear and
reasonableness may also legalize killings that are driven by overt racism
or malice, so long as they appear to be based on fear.
The risk of private fear-based violence may be greater when private
citizens patrol their neighborhoods, either individually or as part of a
Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing
of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1543–45 (2012).
256 See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, The Twin Rivers Case: Of Homeowners
Associations, Free Speech Rights and Privatized Mini-Governments, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
729 (2008) (discussing the Twin Rivers case and the broad powers of Homeowners
Associations); see also Daniel Goldmintz, Note, Lien Priorities: The Defects of Limiting the
“Super Priority” for Common Interest Communities, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 278 n.73 (2011).
257 Rothstein documented the role of private violence and official disregard in enforcing
segregation during the 1960s. White residents, individually and in mobs, visited violence and
intimidation on Black residents who moved into white neighborhoods, yet local police and
prosecutors “stood by as rocks were thrown and crosses were burned,” refusing to stop the
violence or punish the offenders. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24, at 142–51.
258 See generally BELL, supra note 201.
259 See id. at 86–87.
260 Id. at 86–106.
255
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neighborhood watch group, with the goal of identifying and confronting
criminals or suspicious people. George Zimmerman proudly identified
himself as a neighborhood watch captain, and his encounter with
Trayvon Martin occurred when he was patrolling his neighborhood in
the wake of stories about Black male teenagers breaking into houses. 261
Even if neighborhood watch members are unarmed, as Zimmerman
was, their very structure and goals invite confrontation, potentially
increasing the risk of violence. In White spaces, the rules of justifiable
homicide affect White people and Black people very differently, making
White people the vindicated protectors and Black people vulnerable to
violence.
C.

Ownership and Vulnerability

In a column written in response to Trayvon Martin’s death,
journalist Charles Blow explained the vulnerability experienced by Black
families who know that suspicion, even if misplaced, can be the basis for
legalized killing:
This is the fear that seizes me whenever my boys are out in the world:
that a man with a gun and an itchy finger will find them “suspicious.”
That passions may run hot and blood run cold. That it might all end
with a hole in their chest and hole in my heart. That the law might
prove insufficient to salve my loss. 262

Black people in White spaces bear the double burden of being racially
suspicious and racially salient. Blackness increases the likelihood that
people will see innocent actions as threatening. Being non-White in a
White space means one will always look out of place.
This combination of perceived threat and looking out of place can
be enough to legalize a killing because whether a homicide is justifiable
turns on whether the killer’s perception of threat was reasonable, not
whether it was true. Expanded self-defense laws have relaxed or
eliminated many of the core limitations on the use of force, especially in
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1161–64.
Charles M. Blow, The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/opinion/blow-the-curious-case-of-trayvon-martin.html?
_r=1&ref=charlesmblow [http://perma.cc/Y7Q6-UJ66].
261
262
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or around the home, so a person patrolling the neighborhood for
suspected burglars would likely be justified in shooting someone as long
as the police, prosecutor, or jury were convinced that the fear of crime
was real and that the victim really did look threatening and out of place.
Fear of crime, of course, does not need to be related to a risk of actual
crime. 263 Self-defense laws function in part to remind Black people in
White spaces that the law permits their neighbors to follow them and
kill them simply because they look suspicious and out of place.
Ownership of, and thus the need to protect, property may be
expansively interpreted, as when the law protects the rights of renters to
police homes they do not own and the right of homeowners to police
property they do not occupy. In 2014, Wayne Burgarello killed Cody
Devine and wounded Janai Wilson when he found the two squatting in
an abandoned duplex that he owned. Burgarello claimed self-defense
and was acquitted by a jury. 264 He did not invoke Nevada’s defense of
habitation law, but instead said he thought Devine had a gun (which
turned out to be a flashlight) and relied on Nevada’s stand your ground
law to explain why he chose to respond to the trespasser with violence
instead of fleeing. 265 Moreover, individuals are not confined to
protecting their own homes. When Joe Horn shot and killed Miguel
Antonio DeJesus and Diego Ortiz after he saw them breaking into a
neighbor’s home, a grand jury refused to indict him. 266 Horn
emphasized that the men crossed into his yard, but he also predicated
263 Cf. Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The Theory and Research Behind Neighborhood Watch: Is it a
Sound Fear and Crime Reduction Strategy, 33 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 103 (1987) (studying the
effects of neighborhood watch in reducing fear amongst neighbors and concluding that “[f]ear
reduction may not be possible or even desirable given the objective of increasing citizen crime
prevention behaviors”); James C. Wo, John R. Hipp & Adam Boessen, Voluntary Organizations
and Neighborhood Crime: A Dynamic Perspective, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 212 (2016) (same).
264 See, e.g., Marcella Corona, Burgarello Not Guilty in Fatal Sparks Shooting, RENO GAZETTE
J. (May 29, 2015), https://www.rgj.com/story/news/crime/2015/05/29/jury-decides-burgarelloverdict-murder-trial/28189467 [https://perma.cc/FV22-8AJU].
265 Id.; see Assoc. Press & Scott Sonner, ‘Stand Your Ground’ in Nevada: Killing of Unarmed
Trespasser was Self-defense, Lawyer Says, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 19, 2004, 1:58 PM), http://
www.mercurynews.com/2014/08/19/stand-your-ground-in-nevada-killing-of-unarmedtrespasser-was-self-defense-lawyer-says [http://perma.cc/RY64-FVZK].
266 See Chris Bury & Howard L. Rosenberg, Man Cleared for Killing Neighbor’s Burglars,
ABC NEWS (2008), https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5278638&page=1 [https://
perma.cc/5HQY-PMQM]. I thank Adrian Hernandez for suggesting that I discuss the Horn
acquittal.
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his defense on a Texas statute that permits deadly force in defense of
tangible property. 267 In the Horn case, his visual assessment that the
men stole his neighbor’s property, coupled with their presence in his
yard, was enough to support a claim of self-defense strong enough to
avoid an indictment. In each of these cases, the defendants relied on
multiple doctrines, including defense of property, no-retreat rules, and
defense of home. The cases demonstrate how discrete rules operate
together to significantly expand—both spatially and conceptually—on
the common law ideas about defense of home.
As Onwuachi-Willig and Bell have explained, using violence to
protect one’s home and neighborhood is a racially-charged endeavor:
Whites have long used violence to keep Black people out of White
spaces. 268 Writing about Martin’s death, Onwuachi-Willig explained
that Martin was vulnerable to being profiled by Zimmerman precisely
because residents understood the neighborhood to be a “white space”
and considered unknown Blacks to be “intruders.” 269 These scholars
document the significance of White spaces in “preserving the material
benefits and the psychological wages of Whiteness” 270 and explore how
and why residents use violence to police and protect them. 271 This
dynamic of ownership and violence depends on and reproduces “the
same racist principles” more explicitly expressed half a century ago in
the same cities. 272 While Bell characterizes this violence as contrary to
law, 273 this Article argues that state self-defense laws actually permit and
even encourage this type of private violence. 274 For White residents of
White spaces, expanded self-defense laws are a reminder that the law

See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 9.41, 9.42, 9.43 (West 2019).
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1170–72; see also BELL, supra note 201.
269 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1121, 1182.
270 Id. at 1119.
271 Id. at 1151–85; BELL, supra note 201, at 43–47.
272 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1119.
273 See BELL, supra note 201, at 6; accord Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1167 (describing
Zimmerman’s acquittal as the result of poor prosecutorial effort); id. at 1175 (describing how
police discouraged the neighborhood watch group from “being a vigilante police force” and
told them not to carry guns).
274 Onwuachi-Willig also points out that the law sometimes condones violence. See
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1164–65.
267
268
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permits them to use violence, even lethal violence, to defend themselves,
their families, and their homes from intruders.
For example, the necessity principle requires that one retreat before
using deadly force. One of the earliest modifications of this principle,
the castle doctrine, is premised on the idea that a man need not retreat
in his home because he has a special relationship—one of ownership
and a corollary duty to protect—to his house. In other places, a person
was required to retreat before using deadly force, but in the home one
was permitted, even encouraged, not to back down.
Home defense laws express a similar idea about the importance of
the home and a person’s right and duty to protect that space. They allow
for a person to use deadly force as soon as an intruder has met some
triggering condition related to breaching the security of the home.
Usually, this condition is that the intruder has entered the home. 275
Some laws permit deadly force as soon as an intruder has entered a yard
or porch, expanding the boundaries of defensible space to include the
area around one’s home. 276 In Nevada, the triggering condition is that a
person feared that the potential intruder was about to enter the home.
This kind of law does not have a precise spatial boundary, so a person
outside the home may be the target of justifiable homicide as long as he
is close enough to give rise to a belief by the resident that he plans to
break in.
If a yard is demarcated by a wall or bounded by a gate, presence in
the yard alone could be enough to justify deadly force under a broadlyworded defense of habitation law. 277 Walls establish such a clear
boundary that seeing an unfamiliar person inside the walled perimeter

275 California’s defense of habitation law is an example of this type. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 198.5 (West 2019) (permitting a person to presume an imminent threat of deadly force when
“another person, not a member of the family or household, . . . unlawfully and forcibly enters or
has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence”). This leads to questions about what
constitutes the threshold of a home. See People v. Brown, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that entry onto an attached but uncovered porch does not constitute entry into
the home).
276 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(5) (West 2019) (porch included in definition of
dwelling); State v. Kuhns, 817 S.E.2d 828, 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (yard included in definition
of home); see also Green, supra note 150, at 17 (defense of habitation sometimes available
against intruders who break into outbuildings).
277 See supra Section I.C.2.
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may, without more, be sufficient to establish reasonable fear. 278 As a
homicide detective said when explaining (before the prosecutor
determined whether or not charges would be filed) that Demarcus
Carter was “likely trying to gain entry” to the home, “[t]here was no
reason for anybody to be back there, especially someone he didn’t
know . . . . There was a tall block wall and a padlocked gate. No easy
access.” 279 Locked gates and guardhouses add an additional layer of
security to a neighborhood or community, further underscoring the
assumption (already available in Nevada law) that anyone who looks out
of place near a home is probably trying to break in. When coupled with
walls and locked gates, unfamiliarity may be enough to support a claim
of self-defense, as in the case of Carter’s death.
Together, the castle doctrine and the defense of habitation rule
send a powerful message that a home is a special kind of space that the
resident is entitled to defend. They underscore that it is one’s right to
defend one’s home (perhaps including the yard or porch). Perhaps they
even signal that defending one’s home is a duty, not just a right. When
these two rules (defense of habitation and no-retreat) are expanded
outside the home, they encourage people to see the space outside their
homes as their rightful territory, a place where they have a right to be
and are not required to back down. The first line of expansion includes
home-like spaces, such as campers, workplaces, cars, boats, and
campsites. When state laws permit a presumption of threat and/or
eliminate the retreat requirement in these spaces, the rationale of home
defense travels to those spaces too. They expand the idea of defensible
space from a home to several specific spaces outside the home.
Stand your ground laws eliminate the retreat requirement
completely, providing that a person faced with a deadly threat may

278 The significance of walls and closed doors in establishing what will count as reasonable
fear is underscored by the proliferation of smart doorbells and some residents’ claim that
anyone photographed outside the door must be engaging in suspicious behavior. See Bea
Bischoff, Amazon’s Smart Doorbell is Creepy as Hell, MEDIUM: ONE ZERO (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://onezero.medium.com/amazons-smart-doorbell-is-creepy-as-hell-faaac4a9d6c3 [https://
perma.cc/P6SB-TN8C] (describing incidents of racial profiling on social media sites and
linking it to the danger or profiling via smart doorbells).
279 Mike Blasky, Man Slain in Summerlin Yard Had Lengthy Record, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime/courts/man-slain-summerlinyard-had-lengthy-record [http://perma.cc/9N7L-XLTE].

Rolnick.40.4.3 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

5/17/2019 10:04 AM

DEFENDING WHITE SPACE

1713

respond with deadly force anywhere. If the rationale for the castle
doctrine centers on a man’s ownership of his home, and his
corresponding duty to defend it, stand your ground laws invite people
to exercise the same ownership right over any square of space. In the
context of a neighborhood, they also function to expand the idea of
defensible space even further in that they permit a person to protect and
patrol one’s neighborhood with the knowledge that, if a confrontation
with a suspected intruder does ensue, one need not retreat and can
instead use deadly force if the conflict escalates. This story of patrolling
and protecting the neighborhood provided the foundation for George
Zimmerman’s choice to follow and confront Trayvon Martin. 280 On the
other hand, a Black resident of a White neighborhood may be entitled to
use force without retreating if a person breaks into his house, but he will
not have the same right, as a practical matter, to search his yard, his
sidewalk, and his neighborhood for an intruder.
The death of Jonathan Mitchell in Albuquerque’s Ventana Ranch
subdivision illustrates the way that self-defense law may not protect
Black residents of White spaces. If they wield guns to protect their
homes and neighborhoods, their neighbors may be more likely to see
their actions as a threat, rather than as self-defense. Mitchell, a twentythree-year-old African American veteran, was standing in a driveway in
his neighborhood with a gun. 281 The neighborhood, Ventana Ranch, is a
far Northwest Albuquerque subdivision of gated and walled
communities with amenities that include a tennis court and a pool. The

As Angela Onwuachi-Willig explains, Zimmerman and some of his neighbors had
become increasingly concerned about an alleged “rash” of break-ins in which the suspects were
described as Black men. His claim that Martin matched the description of a suspect was based
only on this vague sense that the homes in the neighborhood needed to be protected from Black
male teenagers. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3, at 1174–80. Indeed, hearkening back to the
origins of the castle doctrine and the true man rule, Zimmerman seemed especially concerned
about protecting women who were home alone in his neighborhood. Onwuachi-Willig, supra
note 18, at 23, 27.
281 See Nicole Perez, NAACP Seeks Action in ABQ Veteran’s Shooting, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Oct.
7, 2013), https://www.abqjournal.com/276880/action-sought-in-vets-shooting.html [https://
perma.cc/WAE2-BSZ4]. A neighbor said Mitchell “brandished” his gun, though the preceding
factual context is not documented in news accounts. Aurelio Sanchez, No ‘Probable Cause’ in
Death, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Mar. 23, 2013), https://www.abqjournal.com/181536/no-probablecause-in-death.html [http://perma.cc/S6D4-MYCS]. I thank the faculty at the University of
New Mexico School of Law for suggesting that I discuss the Mitchell killing.
280
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neighborhood is Whiter and less Latinx than the rest of the city. 282
Mitchell’s neighbor called a third neighbor, Donnie Pearson. 283 Pearson
left his own house and circled the block to investigate, bringing his
young son along. 284 Others contend Mitchell felt threatened by Pearson
circling the block, trigging Michell to fire his gun. 285 Pearson fired back,
killing Mitchell. He claimed self-defense and was not charged. Many
facts in the Albuquerque case are disputed, but Mitchell’s family
describe him as acting in self-defense and maintain that the police
believed Pearson’s version of events because they “treated [Mitchell] like
he was a prowler that didn’t belong in the neighborhood.” 286 As New
Mexico’s self-defense law includes an initial aggressor bar to a claim of
self-defense, 287 the legality of Pearson’s actions depended on the
perception that Mitchell had acted illegally, which in turn depended on
whether authorities believed he was reasonably defending himself
against Pearson.
Expanded self-defense laws communicate ownership over, and a
duty to protect, larger and larger swaths of space. They encourage
residents to police their homes and neighborhoods by signaling that the
use of force against someone who is unfamiliar or seems dangerous will
not be punished. Because spaces, especially neighborhoods, are so
strongly racialized, this right of ownership and duty of protection only

282 See Ventana Ranch, Albuquerque, NM Demographics, AREAVIBES, https://www.area
vibes.com/albuquerque-nm/ventana+ranch/demographics [https://perma.cc/5NYK-E446] (last
visited Feb. 10, 2019). The Black population of Ventana Ranch is lesser than the Black
population of Albuquerque, and Blacks make up less than five percent of the population in
Albuquerque and in Ventana Ranch. All other minorities are under-represented in Ventana
Ranch. Id.
283 Cf. sources cited supra note 281.
284 Earlier stories described Pearson as going directly to the house in question. See Sanchez,
supra note 281. Mitchell’s family said Pearson was circling the block, and police helicopter
footage confirmed that he circled at least once. See Perez, supra note 281; Xena, Justice for
Jonathan Mitchell, BLACKBUTTERFLY7 BLOG (Mar. 17, 2013), https://blackbutterfly7.
wordpress.com/2014/03/17/justice-for-jonathan-mitchell [https://perma.cc/S3F6-N9W9].
285 See Perez, supra note 281.
286 Barron Jones, Mitchell Shooting Investigation Continues, ALIBI, http://alibi.com/news/
44536/Neighborhood-Watch.html [http://perma.cc/KT8T-HHHZ] (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
287 See State v. Lucero, 972 P.2d 1143, 1145 (N.M. 1998).
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extends to people who, in a racial sense, already own the
neighborhood. 288
D.

Precursor Violence: Surveillance and 9-1-1 Calls

Self-defense killing is rare, but the surveillance that provides the
foundation for suspicion and confrontation is not. Neighborhood watch
groups and online communities provide a structure through which
residents can band together to look for the potential or evidence of
crime, and perhaps even address it directly. The law does not constrain
private surveillance in the way that it does government-sponsored
surveillance. Racial profiling by police may be illegal in some
circumstances, 289 but racial profiling by private citizens is perfectly
legal. 290
Residents of Mountain’s Edge, a planned community on the
southwestern outskirts of Las Vegas, created a community Facebook
page to monitor suspicious activity and guard against a perceived spate
of crimes. White residents posted photos of activity they deemed
suspicious, including photos of Black children waiting for their parents
to get home. These same residents sometimes followed their Black
neighbors in order to take photos, and sometimes called security to
report them. 291 In response to complaints about racial profiling, the site
organizer noted that the posts may “offend,” but underscored the

288 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1731 (1993) (the
right to exclude is essential to maintaining Whiteness as a property right); Onwuachi-Willig,
supra note 3, at 1168 (explaining how Trayvon Martin’s death unfolded against a backdrop of
residents seeking to preserve White ownership of, and exclude Blacks from, the Retreat at Twin
Lakes).
289 But see Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946
(2002).
290 See Mark NeJame, Trayvon Martin Shooting Wasn’t a Case of Racial Profiling, CNN (May
30, 2012, 9:09 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/30/opinion/nejame-zimmerman-racialprofiling/index.html [http://perma.cc/6V82-7AAK] (column by attorney explaining that it was
“not illegal” for Zimmerman to follow Martin because of his race).
291 See Michael Burton, Local Facebook Group Details Crimes at Mountain’s Edge, KTNV,
http://www.ktnv.com/news/local-facebook-group-details-crimes-at-mountains-edge [https://
web.archive.org/web/20151011160833/http://www.ktnv.com/news/local-facebook-groupdetails-crimes-at-mountains-edge] (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
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central goal of preventing crime. 292 This pattern has been repeated
across the country as residents use online neighborhood-based
community groups to racially profile their neighbors. 293
Figurative walls can also delineate White spaces, such as the
boundaries created through gentrification of portions of historically
Black neighborhoods. In Oakland, Black residents of a majority White
enclave described feeling scrutinized by their neighbors. 294 While such
feelings are frequently dismissed, the residents of this neighborhood also
created an online community where they posted and shared photos of
suspicious-looking people they saw in the neighborhood, including their
Black neighbors. 295 When profiling their Black neighbors as suspicious,
these White residents invoke the same cultural narrative of the Black
intruder that animated Olivia Bertalan’s testimony in the Zimmerman
trial. 296

292 Id. She admitted that she had no evidence that the group had prevented any crime, but
expressed hope that it might. Id.
293 See, e.g., Harshaw, supra note 120 (describing incidents of racial profiling on Nextdoor);
Nextdoor has since added automatic pop-up messages to crime posts that warn the poster of
the danger of racial profiling and require the poster to use descriptors that go beyond race and
gender. Aarti Shahani, Social Network Nextdoor Moves to Block Racial Profiling Online, NPR
(Aug. 23, 2016, 4:38 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/23/
490950267/social-network-nextdoor-moves-to-block-racial-profiling-online [https://perma.cc/
P8RD-RHK7] (describing how the company responded to pressure from an Oakland
community group concerned about the widespread use of Nextdoor to racially profile). Yet
problems persist. Caroline O’Donovan, Racial Profiling is Still a Problem on Nextdoor,
BUZZFEED NEWS (May 18, 2017, 5:15 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
carolineodonovan/racial-profiling-is-still-a-problem-on-nextdoor
[https://perma.cc/3BFMZW3A] (describing incidents of racial profiling).
294 See Sam Levin, Racial Profiling Via Nextdoor.com, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/racial-profiling-via-nextdoorcom/
Content?oid=4526919 [http://perma.cc/5JGF-LZTC]. Unlike the new Sun Belt suburbs
described elsewhere in this Article, this Oakland neighborhood used to be a Black space until it
underwent gentrification, bringing in more White homeowners and slowly pricing out Black
residents. Id.
295 See id.
296 See supra note 121 (discussing this narrative and how it figures into Bertalan’s testimony,
Theodore Wafer’s self-defense claim, and neighborhood racial profiling). Compare the fear and
violence leveled at suspected Black intruders to the generosity and care shown to students in
college towns who drunkenly stumble into a strangers’ house. See Russell Frank, What to Do
When an Inebriated Stranger Stumbles into Your Home?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/education/edlife/binge-drinking-students-penn-state.html.
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Surveillance intersects directly with violence when people call the
police on their neighbors for complaints ranging from loud parties to
suspected crimes. These callers employ state violence in order to
regulate and punish their neighbors. 297 In 2018, news outlets published a
number of stories documenting the phenomenon of White people
calling, or threatening to call, the police on Black people engaged in
mundane activities in their own neighborhoods. These stories include a
White woman who threatened to call the police on young Black girls
selling water in her neighborhood, a White woman who called the
police to report a Black family picnicking in a local park, and neighbor
who called the police when she saw three Black women leaving a
vacation rental and assumed they were committing a robbery. 298 In
some cases, the police refuse to respond, and many readers ridiculed the
choice to call the police. Yet, sometimes the police do respond 299 and the
297 See generally I. Bennett Capers, supra note 26 (discussing how racialized policing
practices preserve the racial character of places); see Anthony Paul Farley, The Poetics of
Colorlined Space, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 97, 110–11
(Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). It is important to recognize how both self-policing in the
form of surveillance and self-defense killings work in tandem with the act of calling the police
for minor infractions—an act which can result in anything from fear to death. For example,
George Zimmerman called 9-1-1 over forty times in the years preceding Trayvon Martin’s
death to report suspicious activity in the neighborhood. See Lizette Alvarez, A Florida Law Gets
Scrutiny after a Teenager’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/
03/21/us/justice-department-opens-inquiry-in-killing-of-trayvon-martin.html
[http://
perma.cc/3GV2-ECLJ].
298 Sam Levin, California Women Threatens to Call Police on Eight-Year-Old Black Girl for
Selling Water, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2018/jun/25/permit-patty-eight-year-old-selling-water-san-francisco-video [https://perma.cc/
T9Q8-TNH3] (discussing such instances); Jamiles Lartey, Oppression in America: ‘To Root This
Out We Need a Movement Against Racist Policies’, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/06/everyday-racism-in-america-how-to-fix-it
[https://perma.cc/V636-VH6S] (same).
299 Indeed, early efforts are underway to enable communication between police and
residents’ smart doorbell footage. Sarah Emerson, A Smart Doorbell Company is Working with
Cops to Report “Suspicious” People and Activities, MOTHERBOARD (May 8, 2018, 8:51 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/evkgpw/smart-doorbell-company-ring-is-workingwith-cops-to-report-suspicious-people-and-activities [https://perma.cc/2DST-6D3M] (Ring);
Tanvi Misra, Who’s Afraid of Amazon’s Video Doorbell?, CITYLAB (Dec. 26, 2018), https://
www.citylab.com/equity/2018/12/amazon-facial-recognition-ring-smart-doorbell-cameraprivacy/578485 [https://perma.cc/84U2-NZH5] (describing Amazon’s patent application for
more advanced facial recognition capabilities to ring doorbells in order to “allow users to
receive detailed information about who is approaching the house in real time, ‘enabling users to
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threat of violence is realized. In 2015, in McKinney, Texas, a Dallas
suburb profiled for its reluctance to accept Section 8 vouchers, Officer
Eric Casebolt wrestled a fourteen-year-old Black girl to the ground 300
after he responded to a call by residents of a subdivision who were
complaining about a teenager’s pool party, which took place at the
subdivision’s gated and locked pool. 301
This sense of ownership and entitlement to protection 302 is
apparent in two of the most well-publicized incidents of White people
calling the police on Black people they believe do not belong in a
particular space. When Alison Ettel (a.k.a. “Permit Patty”) called the
police to report that her eight-year-old neighbor was selling water
without a permit, she claimed only that the girl and her cousin were
breaking permit rules, not that they posed a threat of any kind. 303 When
Dr. Jennifer Schulte (a.k.a. “Barbeque Becky”) called the police to report
a Black family in a park, she claimed in the first call that the family was

make more educated decisions on whether the person is suspicious or dangerous, and also
whether or not to identify law enforcement, family members, neighbors of the like.’”).
300 See Dorothy A. Brown, McKinney Pool Party Incident Has Everything to Do with Race,
CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/09/opinions/brown-mckinney-pool-party/index.html
[http://perma.cc/ED9V-XLXJ] (last updated June 9, 2015).
301 Besides reporting allegedly disruptive behavior to the police, the caller could have
invoked the neighborhood’s HOA rules to discipline the party hosts. See Sundance, The Full
Story of the McKinney Texas, Pool Mob—Inside the “Craig Ranch” Subdivision, CONSERVATIVE
TREEHOUSE (June 8, 2015), https://theconservativetreehouse.com/2015/06/08/the-full-story-ofthe-mckinney-texas-pool-mob-inside-the-craig-ranch-subdivision
[http://perma.cc/HDL687MD] (detailing the ways the pool party, hosted by a Black resident of the subdivision,
violated the HOA’s standards for pool use); Demographic and Income Profile, ENCORE ENT.
(Jan.
14,
2016),
https://images3.loopnet.com/d2/
AS7orPVJNAGtTIeFGIWmAJryfGAnQMS0gosC-2mifiA/document.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
4UTM-8DZB] (Craig Ranch’s residents are 73% White, making it less White than other
McKinney neighborhoods but more White than most neighborhoods in the greater Dallas
area); see also Olga Khazan, After the Police Brutality Video Goes Viral, ATLANTIC (July 23,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/after-the-police-brutality-videogoes-viral/564863 [https://perma.cc/ZHZ5-35EA] (describing how Craig Ranch is known as the
“‘new’ side, the ‘good’ side, and sometimes the ‘white’ side” of McKinney, and describing how
the teenaged party-goers said neighbors told them to “go back to your Section 8 housing” and
how some in the neighborhood later emphasized that the party violated HOA rules).
302 As Cheryl Harris has explained, this “settled expectation” of privilege is a defining
characteristic of Whiteness as a property right. Harris, supra note 288, at1714.
303 See Levin, California Women, supra note 298.
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being disruptive. 304 When the police did not arrive promptly, she called
back to demand that they attend to her complaint. In the second call,
she implied that she was afraid they would hurt her, saying, “I’m really
scared! You gotta come quick!” 305 Both women were using the police to
discipline Black people in neighborhood spaces. In making the second
call, Schulte invoked the script of White female fear and Black bodies
out of place that underlies some home defense claims. Her recitation of
fear and demand for police response is evidence that she views the
police as required to respond to her, and that she knows the correct
words to ensure that it happens; it does not seem to matter whether the
words are recited convincingly.
White residents’ actions may elicit sympathy if they seem to be
driven by a fear of crime 306 or a desire to protect women at home
alone, 307 but it is important to recognize that this fear and protectiveness
is both racially charged and not necessarily grounded in actual risk of
crime. 308 New White spaces like Summerlin may be some of the safest
neighborhoods in terms of comparative crime statistics, but residents
may nevertheless prioritize crime control and protection via formation
of neighborhood watch groups, investment in security technology, and
maintenance of online communities where neighbors can report
suspicious activity or potential criminals. These activities are
unregulated, often hidden, and probably entirely legal. Should they
create the conditions for a killing, the killer’s actions may be legal as well
if taken in alleged self-defense.

304 Christina Zhao, ‘BBQ Becky,’ White Woman Who Called Cops on Black BBQ, 911 Audio
Released: “I’m Really Scared! Come Quick”, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 4, 2018, 5:42 AM), https://
www.newsweek.com/bbq-becky-white-woman-who-called-cops-black-bbq-911-audio-releasedim-really-1103057 [https://perma.cc/F55X-K47X ].
305 Id.
306 Randy Alcorn, Trayvon Martin Case—Racism or Reality?, NOOZHAWK (July 21, 2013),
https://www.noozhawk.com/article/randy_alcorn_trayvon_martin_case_racism_or_reality
[http://perma.cc/9BDZ-G8P9] (profiling by citizens justified by fear of crime).
307 Cf. Race, Law and the Zimmerman Verdict, NATION (July 17, 2013), https://www.the
nation.com/article/race-law-and-zimmerman-verdict [http://perma.cc/D2B3-CJTU].
308 See supra notes 122, 263 and accompanying text (describing the way fear of crime is often
unrelated to risk of crime).
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CONCLUSION
State self-defense laws provide a legal mechanism through which
residents of a neighborhood can surveille, intimidate, punish, and even
remove their neighbors. These laws have demarcated progressively
wider spaces that a person is legally permitted to protect with deadly
force, effectively allowing residents of White neighborhoods to police
people who stand out in those neighborhoods because of their race and
ensuring that those racially-salient people never fully belong there.
These laws imbue split-second assessments of threat—demonstrated to
be racially contingent, even if unconsciously so—with the force of law.
They also provide cover for private citizens acting out of more malicious
intent. When states expand the right of self-defense, removing more
situations from review and adding shortcuts to ensure that it applies to
more scenarios, those states invite private individuals to help law
enforcement by policing their own domains, even authorizing the use of
lethal private violence to do so. In White spaces, these laws remind
White residents of their authority and Black residents of their
vulnerability.
Acknowledging the race-specific meaning of self- and homedefense laws does not necessarily determine whether any particular selfdefense law is desirable. For example, some legislators might choose to
support a law with potentially discriminatory effects if the law is
invoked rarely, has a significant deterrent effect, and if the data shows
that the racial effects are minimal in practice. To make such an
assessment, though, a legislator must consider the race-specific
meanings of self-defense laws in the neighborhood context. This might
lead to requests for quantitative and qualitative data, including stories
from Black residents of White spaces, about how these laws are used and
what they mean to people. While I suspect that many expansion laws
serve no useful purpose and should therefore be rejected because of the
racialized signaling described here, a full assessment of desirability of
specific laws, or further proposals for doctrinal reform, is beyond the
scope of this Article.
State legislators confronted with proposed laws to expand selfdefense should be aware of the way these laws can and do function in
White neighborhoods. At a minimum, lawmakers should consider what
expanded laws would signal to White and Black residents of White
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spaces, as well as the potential for racially biased effects. While race will
not be their only consideration, they should weigh these questions when
determining the costs and benefits of any proposed change to the
criminal law. As a corollary, states should better track how their selfdefense laws are used. Lawmakers must have data that tells them how
often these laws are used, who claims their benefit, and what kind of
killings are legalized (including those found justified by a jury as well as
those not charged), where they occur, who is killing, and who is dying.
Members of the public should pay careful attention to any proposed
amendment to state criminal law that would legalize more private
killings, especially when there is no clear demonstration that existing
law has been applied too narrowly. In the case of expansions that do not
address a gap in existing law, the expressive effect described here is
especially important to consider.
The Trump Administration in 2017 signaled clearly that crime
control and support for law enforcement would be federal policy
priorities for at least the next four years. The administration envisions
the federal role as one of supporting, rather than monitoring and
restraining, state and local criminal justice systems. It also envisions
private citizens as important partners to local police. The policy
statement on the White House website highlights the relationship
between official and private violence by linking support for law
enforcement with private exercise of Second Amendment rights and
underscoring the role of this public-private partnership in protecting
parents, children, and senior citizens against immigrants, gangs, and
“the rioter, the looter, or the violent disrupter.” 309
This kind of public-private law enforcement partnership, and the
racially-coded description of its targets, recall the Reconstruction and
Jim Crow eras, when private violence worked hand-in-hand with local
law enforcement to enforce racial hierarchies and the Department of
Justice arose out of a need for federal intervention. Unlike its
predecessor, however, the current Department of Justice is likely to
serve as a facilitator, rather than a disruptor, in this relationship. One
309 Matt Zapotosky, Trump White House Vows It Won’t Coddle ‘the Rioter, the Looter, or the
Violent Disruptor’, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/01/20/trump-white-house-vows-to-take-on-the-rioter-the-looter-or-theviolent-disrupter/?utm_term=.30f11ced4e1b [https://perma.cc/6CA3-SFJB].
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manifestation of this new federal-local-private collaboration will be the
use of state criminal laws, including self-defense laws, to sanction more
private violence, and a parallel lack of federal civil rights enforcement.
Because they reflect local norms and long-held prejudices, state criminal
laws have often been used in the past to target people of color 310 and to
enforce racial hierarchies, and we can expect that they may be used this
way in the future.

310 As another example of the way criminal law can be used to target disfavored groups, the
North Dakota legislature considered a bill in the wake of the #NoDAPL protests that would
have altered the burdens and presumptions applicable when a motorist kills or injures a
protestor on a roadway, effectively insulating those killings from judicial review and sanctions
by presuming that they are non-negligent. The law eventually did not pass. H.J. 487, 65th Legis.
Assemb., at 487 (2017), https://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/65-2017/journals/hr-dailyjnl28.pdf#Page487 [https://perma.cc/AAH7-K6QP] (“HB 1203: A BILL for an Act . . . relating to
the liability exemption of a motor vehicle driver; and . . . relating to pedestrians on
roadways . . . failed.”).

